In the past decade the global financial assistance for AIDS responses increased tremendously and the donor community provided greater resources to community responses. Yet little is known about the global magnitude of these resources and their allocation among HIV and AIDS activities and services. To address this knowledge gap, this report pulls together evidence from several different sources (donor data bases, surveys of civil society organizations, country funding profiles) to determine, among other things, how funds are reaching civil society and community-based organizations, how these funds are being used, and the degree to which these organizations rely on other sources of funding. The analysis suggests that funding flows have increased dramatically for civil society organizations (CSOs), reaching at least $690 million per year on average during the period 2003 2009. However, much smaller funding is reaching organizations at local level. The report documents the impact achieved by this funding. Traditionally, civil society organizations have been perceived at times to be providers of humanitarian aid, innovators in implementing responses adapted to local needs, or inefficient actors diverting public funds from more effective uses. The report argues that current evidence shows that community responses play a useful complementary role to national AIDS programs that has been achieved with relatively little funding. Contrary to a widespread view, the report highlights that community responses add resources to national programs. In Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, substantial mobilization of resources in the form of volunteers are mobilized by communities. There is a strong risk that in the current environment of increased resource scarcity, prevention programs implemented by civil society organizations would be cut unless there is strong evidence of value for money being generated. Community-based organizations are ill equipped to answer that question, but there is scope for improving the results that they generate. The report argues that improving coordination with national programs, strengthening consistency between local activities and HIV epidemics, building stronger network of civil society organizations, and mobilizing sustainable funding are the most important ways for community responses to move forward and address the challenges faced by community responses.
Countries regularly track gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator of their economic progress, but not wealth—the assets such as infrastructure, forests, minerals, and human capital that produce GDP. In contrast, corporations routinely report on both their income and assets to assess their economic health and prospects for the future. Wealth accounts allow countries to take stock of their assets to monitor the sustainability of development, an urgent concern today for all countries. The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018: Building a Sustainable Future covers national wealth for 141 countries over 20 years (1995†“2014) as the sum of produced capital, 19 types of natural capital, net foreign assets, and human capital overall as well as by gender and type of employment. Great progress has been made in estimating wealth since the fi rst volume, Where Is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the 21st Century, was published in 2006. New data substantially improve estimates of natural capital, and, for the fi rst time, human capital is measured by using household surveys to estimate lifetime earnings. The Changing Wealth of Nations 2018 begins with a review of global and regional trends in wealth over the past two decades and provides examples of how wealth accounts can be used for the analysis of development patterns. Several chapters discuss the new work on human capital and its application in development policy. The book then tackles elements of natural capital that are not yet fully incorporated in the wealth accounts: air pollution, marine fi sheries, and ecosystems. This book targets policy makers but will engage anyone committed to building a sustainable future for the planet.
Climate change and migration are major concerns in the MENA region, yet the empirical evidence on the impact of climate change and extreme weather events on migration remains limited. Information is broadly lacking on how households in vulnerable areas perceive changes in the climate, how they are affected by extreme weather events, whether they benefit from community and government programs to help them cope with and adapt to a changing climate, and how these conditions influence the decision of household members to migrate, either temporarily or permanently. This introductory chapter summarizes briefly the main results of the study which relied on existing data as well as focus groups and new household surveys collected in 2011 in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen. The results suggest that households do perceive important changes in the climate, and that many households are being affected by extreme weather events resulting in losses in income, crops, and livestock. The coping and adaptation strategies used by households to deal with weather shocks are diverse, but also limited, with most households not able to recover from the negative impact of weather shocks. The ability of community level responses and government programs to support households is also very limited. Finally, while climate change is not today the main driver of migration flows, it does appear to contribute substantially to these flows, so that worsening climatic conditions are likely to exacerbate future migration flows.
Instead of targeting poor areas, should poverty programs target households with personal attributes that foster poverty, no matter where they live? Maybe not, these results suggest. Instead of targeting poor areas, should poverty programs target households with personal attributes that foster poverty, no matter where they live? Possibly not. There may be hidden constraints on mobility, or location may reveal otherwise hidden household attributes. Using survey data for Bangladesh, Ravallion and Wodon find significant and sizeable geographic effects on living standards, after controlling for a wide range of nongeographic characteristics of households, as would typically be observable to policymakers. The geographic effects are reasonably stable over time, robust to testable sources of bias, and consistent with observed migration patterns. Poor areas are not poor just because households with readily observable attributes that foster poverty are geographically concentrated. There appear to be sizable spatial differences in the returns to given household characteristics. Their results reinforce the case for antipoverty programs targeted to poor areas even in an economy with few obvious impediments to mobility. This paper- a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to better inform antipoverty policies in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under research project Policies for Poor Areas (RPO 678-69).
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