States in transition are especially at risk. Despite the magnitude of the threat, there is little understanding of the security threats by the PCNs and how and why political-criminal relationships are formed and maintained. Menace to Society is the first attempt to develop an analytical framework for making generalizations about this contemporary scourge.
Case studies of Colombia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia and Ukraine, and the United States by leading scholars and practitioners included here answer such key questions as: How do PCNs get established? How is a PCN maintained, and destroyed? What do the participants want from each other in a PCN? What can be learned from those who have successfully countered the PCN?
The findings indicate that political, economic, and cultural factors play a significant role in the formation and evolution of PCNs. When the institutions of the state are weak, as in Nigeria and Colombia, it is difficult for the state to prevent political-criminal collaboration. A lack of checks and balances, either from civil society or opposition political parties such as described in the cases of Mexico and Russia, is a key factor. Cultural patterns tend to facilitate this kind of collaboration. Markets and economics, too, bear on the PCN issue. The supply and demand for illegal goods and services, not only drugs, in many countries creates a market controlled by criminals who need political help to "run" their business.
Menace to Society will be critical reading for security planners, foreign and military policymakers, and political scientists.
Organized Crime and Democratic Governability brings together scholars and specialists, including current and former government officials, from both sides of the border to trace the history and define the reality of this situation. Their diverse perspectives place the issue of organized crime in historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts unattainable by single-author studies. Contributors examine broad issues related to the political systems of both countries, as well as the specific actors—crime gangs, government officials, prosecutors, police, and the military—involved in the ongoing drama of the border. Editors Bailey and Godson provide an interpretive frame, a “continuum of governability,” that will guide researchers and policymakers toward defining goals and solutions to the complex problem that, along with a border, the United States and Mexico now share.
Godson defines covert action as influencing events in other parts of the world without attribution, and counterintelligence as identifying, neutralizing, and exploiting the secret activities of others. Together they provide the capability to resist manipulation and control others to advantage. Counterintelligence protects U.S. military, technological, and diplomatic secrets and turns adversary intelligence to U.S. advantage. Covert action enables the United States to weaken adversaries and to assist allies who may be hampered by open acknowledgment of foreign support.
Drawing on contemporary and historical literature, broad-ranging contacts with senior intelligence officials in many countries, as well as his own research and experience as a longtime consultant to the U.S. government, Godson traces the history of U.S. covert action and counterintelligence since 1945, showing that covert action works well when it is part of a well-coordinated policy and when policy makers are committed to succeeding in the long-term. Godson argues that the best counterintelligence is an offensive defense. His exposition of the essential theoretical foundations of both covert action and counterintelligence, supported by historical examples, lays out the ideal conditions for their use, as well as demonstrating why they are so difficult to attain.
This book will be of interest to students and general readers interested in political science, national security, foreign policy, and military policy.