The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides entitlement communities (metro. cities and urban counties) and states with significant discretion in how they distribute funds for eligible activities. Entitlement communities may use a variety of processes to select individual projects, and states may also use different methods to distribute funds to non-entitlement communities. This report examines: (1) the various methods by which entitlement communities use and distribute their CDBG funds to individual projects within their jurisdictions; (2) the various methods by which states distribute CDBG funds to non-entitlement communities; and (3) HUD¿s role in overseeing these methods. Illus. This is a print on demand publication.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The surge in mortgage foreclosures that began in late 2006 and continues today was initially driven by deterioration in the performance of non-prime loans. Non-prime mortgage originations increased dramatically from 2000 through 2006, rising from 12% of all mortgage originations to 34%. The non-prime market contracted sharply in mid-2007, in response to increasing defaults and foreclosures for these loans. This report: (1) provides info. on the performance of non-prime loans through 12/31/09; (2) examines how loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions influenced the likelihood of default of non-prime loans; and (3) describes the features of data on non-prime loan performance and borrower characteristics. Illus.
The number of nonprime mortgage originations grew rapidly from 2000 through 2006, a period during which average house prices appreciated dramatically. The nonprime share of mortgage originations rose from 12% in 2000 to 34% in 2006. As house prices subsequently fell, the subprime and Alt-A market segments contracted sharply. Borrowers who had obtained nonprime mortgages earlier in the decade increasingly fell behind on their mortgage payments. This report: (1) provides info. on the performance of these nonprime loans as of 6/30/09, and describes forecasts made by others of future loan performance; and (2) examines the extent of negative home equity among nonprime borrowers in selected metro. areas and nationwide.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Many lenders have been reluctant to offer conventional loans -- that is, loans not guaranteed by the fed. gov¿t. -- to small bus. (SB). While the SBA loan guarantee programs are intended to help SB raise critical financing that they may have difficulty obtaining from other sources, the availability of such loans has also declined. This report reviews SBA¿s efforts to implement the 8 Amer. Recovery and Reinvest. Act (ARRA) admin. provisions. This report discusses the extent to which: (1) SBA has implemented the 8 ARRA admin. provisions; (2) ARRA admin. provisions and other actions are enhancing liquidity in the markets for SBA loans; and (3) SBA has implemented the ARC Loan Program and how its terms appeal to market participants.
The fed. gov¿t. long-standing policy has been to use its buying power -- the billions of dollars it spends through contracting each year -- to maximize procurement opportunities for small businesses, including those owned by service-disabled veterans. The Dept. of Veterans Affairs (VA) is to give first and second priority to small businesses owned by service-disabled and other veterans, respectively, when it uses small business preferences to award its contracts. The act also requires VA to establish contracting goals for service disabled veteran-owned small businesses and other veteran-owned small businesses. This report makes publicly available the contents of a briefing held on Jan. 30, 2009 which reviews the VA¿s goals. Charts and tables.
The U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev't. (HUD), through its Fed. Housing Admin. (FHA), provides insurance for private lenders against losses on home mortgages. FHA's largest insurance program is the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which currently is self-financed & operates at a profit. FHA submitted a re-estimateÓ of $7 billion for the credit subsidy & interest for the Fund as of the end of FY 2003, reflecting a reduction in estimated profits. Given this substantial re-estimate, this report determines what factors contributed to the $7 billion re-estimate & the underlying loan performance variables influencing these factors. Also, assesses how the loan performance variables underlying the re-estimate could impact future estimates of new loans. Illus.