International migration, the movement of people across international boundaries, has enormous economic, social and cultural implications in both origin and destination countries. Using original research, this title examines the determinants of migration, the impact of remittances and migration on poverty, welfare, and investment decisions, and the consequences of brain drain, brain gain, and brain waste.
Abstract: The authors investigate the occupational placement of immigrants in the U.S. labor market using census data. They find striking differences among highly educated immigrants from different countries, even after they control for individuals' age, experience, and level of education. With some exceptions, educated immigrants from Latin American and Eastern European countries are more likely to end up in unskilled jobs than immigrants from Asia and industrial countries. A large part of the variation can be explained by attributes of the country of origin that influence the quality of human capital, such as expenditure on tertiary education and the use of English as a medium of instruction. Performance is adversely affected by military conflict at home which may weaken institutions that create human capital and lower the threshold quality of immigrants. The selection effects of U.S. immigration policy also play an important role in explaining cross-country variation. The observed under-placement of educated migrants might be alleviated if home and host countries cooperate by sharing information on labor market conditions and work toward the recognition of qualifications.
"Freund and Özden provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's perception of trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, they analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three important ways: There is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained; Protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent; Irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that tends to favor loss-making industries. The augmented models are more consistent with the observed structure of protection and, in particular explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly designed to maintain prices at a given level. This paper-- a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-- is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade policy formulation"-- World Bank web site.
Non-reciprocal trade preferences and provisions in the GATT/WTO that allow developing countries greater leeway to retain or use protectionist policies are two of the central planks of so-called special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries in the multilateral trading system. This paper surveys the literature on the rationales, institutional features, and economic effectiveness of SDT. A large literature has emerged on SDT in the last 50 years, by both proponents and opponents. We summarize a number of key contributions on the subject, with a special emphasis on the evaluation of the impact of SDT, especially preferential market access.