“How could you, a mathematician, believe that extraterrestrials were sending you messages?” the visitor from Harvard asked the West Virginian with the movie-star looks and Olympian manner. “Because the ideas I had about supernatural beings came to me the same way my mathematical ideas did,” came the answer. “So I took them seriously.”
Thus begins the true story of John Nash, the mathematical genius who was a legend by age thirty when he slipped into madness, and who—thanks to the selflessness of a beautiful woman and the loyalty of the mathematics community—emerged after decades of ghostlike existence to win a Nobel Prize for triggering the game theory revolution. The inspiration for an Academy Award–winning movie, Sylvia Nasar’s now-classic biography is a drama about the mystery of the human mind, triumph over adversity, and the healing power of love.
“In this fascinating, often surprising book, Alvin Roth guides us through the jungles of modern life, pointing to the many markets that are hidden in plain view all around us.” — Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational and The (Honest) Truth About Dishonesty
Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of “goods,” like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? If you’ve ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you’ve participated in a kind of market. This is the territory of matching markets, where “sellers” and “buyers” must choose each other, and price isn’t the only factor determining who gets what.
In Who Gets What—and Why, Nobel laureate Alvin E. Roth reveals the matching markets hidden around us and shows us how to recognize a good match and make smarter, more confident decisions.
“Mr. Roth’s work has been to discover the most efficient and equitable methods of matching, and implement them in the world. He writes with verve and style . . . Who Gets What—and Why is a pleasure to read.” — Wall Street Journal
“A book filled with wit, charm, common sense, and uncommon wisdom.” — Paul Milgrom, professor of economics, Stanford University and Stanford Business School
This book represents the earliest clear, detailed, precise exposition of the central ideas and results of game theory and related decision-making models — unencumbered by technical mathematical details. It offers a comprehensive, time-tested conceptual introduction, with a social science orientation, to a complex of ideas related to game theory including decision theory, modern utility theory, the theory of statistical decisions, and the theory of social welfare functions.
The first three chapters provide a general introduction to the theory of games including utility theory. Chapter 4 treats two-person, zero-sum games. Chapters 5 and 6 treat two-person, nonzero-sum games and concepts developed in an attempt to meet some of the deficiencies in the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. Chapters 7–12 treat n-person games beginning with the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory and reaching into many newer developments. The last two chapters, 13 and 14, discuss individual and group decision making. Eight helpful appendixes present proofs of the famous minimax theorem, several geometric interpretations of two-person zero-sum games, solution procedures, infinite games, sequential compounding of games, and linear programming.
Thought-provoking and clearly expressed, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey is designed for the non-mathematician and requires no advanced mathematical training. It will be welcomed by economists concerned with economic theory, political scientists and sociologists dealing with conflict of interest, experimental psychologists studying decision making, management scientists, philosophers, statisticians, and a wide range of other decision-makers. It will likewise be indispensable for students in courses in the mathematical theory of games and linear programming.
Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way.
By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age.
Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them.
Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers.
The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment.
Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.
In Predictable and Avoidable, Dr Pezzuto offers business school students; academics; and industry experts in the fields of finance, risk management, audit, corporate governance, economics, and regulation, a truly independent and unbiased analysis of the financial crises starting in 2007 and one of the first fully considered expositions of the financial, governance and regulatory reforms needed for the future.
Augmented with personal interviews involving selected global thought leaders and industry experts, the author's narrative focuses on the technical issues that led to the global crisis, but also addresses the human, cultural, and ethical aspects of the events from both sociological and managerial perspectives. The book exposes the root causes and contributes significantly to the debate about the change needed in the banking and finance industries and to supervisory frameworks and regulatory mechanisms.
This analysis enables readers to understand that the crisis we have seen was predictable and should have been avoidable, and that a recurrence can be avoided, if lessons are learned and the right action taken.
First edition published by Prentice-Hall in 2001- ISBN 0130174467.
The second edition includes new structure emphasizing the distinction between the equilibrium and the arbitrage perspectives on valuation and pricing, as well as a new chapter on asset management for the long term investor.
"This book does admirably what it sets out to do - provide a bridge between MBA-level finance texts and PhD-level texts....
many books claim to require little prior mathematical training, but this one actually does so.
This book may be a good one for Ph.D students outside finance who need some basic training in financial theory or for those looking for a more user-friendly introduction to advanced theory.
The exercises are very good."
--Ian Gow, Student, Graduate School of Business, Stanford UniversityCompletely updated edition of classic textbook that fills a gap between MBA level texts and PHD level textsFocuses on clear explanations of key concepts and requires limited mathematical prerequisitesUpdates includes new structure emphasizing the distinction between the equilibrium and the arbitrage perspectives on valuation and pricing, as well as a new chapter on asset management for the long term investor
The author offers a radical yet reasoned way of thinking about games and provides a holistic solution to understanding the difference between games and other types of interactive systems. He clearly details the definitions, concepts, and methods that form the fundamentals of this philosophy. He also uses the philosophy to analyze the history of games and modern trends as well as to design games.
Providing a robust, useful philosophy for game design, this book gives you real answers about what games are and how they work. Through this paradigm, you will be better equipped to create fun games.
Most attempts to explain market failures seek to pinpoint triggering mechanisms that occur hours, days, or weeks before the collapse. Sornette proposes a radically different view: the underlying cause can be sought months and even years before the abrupt, catastrophic event in the build-up of cooperative speculation, which often translates into an accelerating rise of the market price, otherwise known as a "bubble." Anchoring his sophisticated, step-by-step analysis in leading-edge physical and statistical modeling techniques, he unearths remarkable insights and some predictions--among them, that the "end of the growth era" will occur around 2050.
Sornette probes major historical precedents, from the decades-long "tulip mania" in the Netherlands that wilted suddenly in 1637 to the South Sea Bubble that ended with the first huge market crash in England in 1720, to the Great Crash of October 1929 and Black Monday in 1987, to cite just a few. He concludes that most explanations other than cooperative self-organization fail to account for the subtle bubbles by which the markets lay the groundwork for catastrophe.
Any investor or investment professional who seeks a genuine understanding of looming financial disasters should read this book. Physicists, geologists, biologists, economists, and others will welcome Why Stock Markets Crash as a highly original "scientific tale," as Sornette aptly puts it, of the exciting and sometimes fearsome--but no longer quite so unfathomable--world of stock markets.
This complete summary of the ideas from Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff's book "The Art of Strategy" shows how game theory can be relevant and applicable to contexts other than academia, as it aids strategic thinking. In their book, the authors explain the basic rules of game theory, breaking down each section into easy-to-understand segments with real-life examples. This summary is a clear guide to using game theory in all areas of your life to help you make strategic decisions.
Added-value of this summary:
• Save time
• Understand key concepts
• Expand your knowledge
To learn more, read "The Art of Strategy" and become an expert at using game theory to create the best strategies.
Called the "prisoner's dilemma," it is a disturbing and mind-bending game where two or more people may betray the common good for individual gain. Introduced shortly after the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb, the prisoner's dilemma quickly became a popular allegory of the nuclear arms race. Intellectuals such as von Neumann and Bertrand Russell joined military and political leaders in rallying to the "preventive war" movement, which advocated a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union. Though the Truman administration rejected preventive war the United States entered into an arms race with the Soviets and game theory developed into a controversial tool of public policy—alternately accused of justifying arms races and touted as the only hope of preventing them.
A masterful work of science writing, Prisoner's Dilemma weaves together a biography of the brilliant and tragic von Neumann, a history of pivotal phases of the cold war, and an investigation of game theory's far-reaching influence on public policy today. Most important, Prisoner's Dilemma is the incisive story of a revolutionary idea that has been hailed as a landmark of twentieth-century thought.
Understand a game matrix, the prisoners’ dilemma, dominant and mixed strategies, zero-sum games, Pareto efficiency, the Nash equilibrium, and the power of asymmetric information.
Calculate payoffs and outcomes in games involving characters such as Jack and Jill, or Frodo and Gollum. Look at the effects of altruism and hatred on games, and see how games can change over time.
Explore examples looking at gang members, free riders, global governance, a long-term relationship, competing corporations, advertisers and their customers, along with familiar hawk-dove and chicken games.
See game players use every trick in the book to get what they want, with over 50 images to guide through the steps they use to play the game.
This complete summary of the ideas from Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner's book "Think Like A Freak" states how economic theories can also be applied to problems in society. This is the concept of Freakonomics. Freakonomics basically means thinking for yourself and acknowledging the facts. Learning to ‘think like a freak’ means you can tackle the difficult problems that other people ignore. According to Levitt and Dubner, there are eight steps to ‘thinking like a freak’, such as putting away your moral compass, admitting what you don't know and thinking like a child. By applying these principles to your own thinking, you will be ready to tackle bigger problems strategically.
Added-value of this summary:
• Save time
• Learn how to ‘think like a freak’
• Tackle the really difficult problems
To learn more, read “Think Like A Freak” and follow the eight steps to start solving real problems!
Game Theory means rigorous strategic thinking. It is based on the idea that everyone acts competitively and in his own best interest. With the help of mathematical models, it is possible to anticipate the actions of others in nearly all life's enterprises. This book includes down-to-earth examples and solutions, as well as charts and illustrations designed to help teach the concept. In The Complete Idiot's Guide® to Game Theory, Dr. Edward C. Rosenthal makes it easy to understand game theory with insights into:
? The history of the disciple made popular by John Nash, the mathematician dramatized in the film A Beautiful Mind
? The role of social behavior and psychology in this amazing discipline
? How important game theory has become in our society and why
Former columnist for Scientific American's "Mathematical Games" section, Ian Stewart is a professor at the University of Warwick and the author of Another Fine Math You've Got Me Into... and a score of other books of mathematical recreations, popular science, and science fiction. In this collection of pun-studded fables, he once again exercises his immense talent for transforming complicated concepts of modern mathematics into stimulating, accessible fun. Stewart introduces the different kinds of infinity, explains how to build your own virus, explores the brighter ideas of Pascal and Fermat, and even offers a dozen different puzzles for the twelve days of Christmas.
This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the New York Times, tthe American Economic Review, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.
The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies.
Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
"Brilliantly successful."—Bulletin de l'Association des Professeurs de Mathematiques
"The presentation is precise and detailed, the style lucid and almost conversational . . . clearly an outstanding text and work of reference."—Annales
Cartan's Formes Differentielles was first published in France in 1967. It was based on the world-famous teacher's experience at the Faculty of Sciences in Paris, where his reputation as an outstanding exponent of the Bourbaki school of mathematics was first established.
Addressed to second- and third-year students of mathematics, the material skillfully spans the pure and applied branches in the familiar French manner, so that the applied aspects gain in rigor while the pure mathematics loses none of its dignity. This book is equally essential as a course text, as a work of reference, or simply as a brilliant mathematical exercise.
Numerous captivating integer sequences arise along the way, but also many open questions impose themselves. Central among these is the famed Frame-Stewart conjecture. Despite many attempts to decide it and large-scale numerical experiments supporting its truth, it remains unsettled after more than 70 years and thus demonstrates the timeliness of the topic.
Enriched with elaborate illustrations, connections to other puzzles and challenges for the reader in the form of (solved) exercises as well as problems for further exploration, this book is enjoyable reading for students, educators, game enthusiasts and researchers alike.
If playing games is natural for humans, analyzing games is equally natural for mathematicians. Even the simplest of games involves the fundamentals of mathematics, such as figuring out the best move or the odds of a certain chance event. This entertaining and wide-ranging guide demonstrates how simple mathematical analysis can throw unexpected light on games of every type—games of chance, games of skill, games of chance and skill, and automatic games.
Just how random is a card shuffle or a throw of the dice? Is bluffing a valid poker strategy? How can you tell if a puzzle is unsolvable? How large a role does luck play in games like golf and soccer? This book examines each of these issues and many others, along with the general principles behind such classic puzzles as peg solitaire and Rubik's cube. Lucid, instructive, and full of surprises, it will fascinate mathematicians and gamesters alike.
The book begins by describing the strategies and their performance in a clear, straightforward style. The presentation is self-contained, nonmathematical, and accessible to readers at all levels of playing skill, from the novice to the blackjack expert. Careful attention is also given to simplified, but still nearly optimal strategies that are easier to use in a casino. Unlike other books in the literature the author then derives each aspect of the strategy mathematically, to justify its claim to optimality. The derivations mostly use algebra and calculus, although some require more advanced analysis detailed in supporting appendices. For easy comprehension, formulae are translated into tables and graphs through extensive computation.
This book will appeal to everyone interested in blackjack: those with mathematical training intrigued by its application to this popular game as well as all players seeking to improve their performance.
N. Richard Werthamer is retired from a successful career as a scientist and executive, most recently as the Executive Officer of the American Physical Society. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College before receiving his PhD in Theoretical Physics from the University of California at Berkeley. His original research has been published extensively in the world’s leading journals. In this book, he applies his scientific background to the analysis of blackjack.
This second edition, revised and expanded, is now easier to use than ever. Step into the ring and learn to:
Implement an abbreviated system--the "K-O Rookie"-- that's powerful enough to yield a player advantage and simple enough to be mastered in a few hours.
Advance to a profession-level system--the "K-O Preferred"--which performs on par with the most sophisticated systems on the market.
Win the cat-and-mouse game between the casinos and the players.
This self-contained treatment features 88 helpful illustrations. Its subjects include topological spaces and properties, some advanced calculus, differentiable manifolds, orientability, submanifolds and an embedding theorem, and tangent spaces. Additional topics comprise vector fields and integral curves, surgery, classification of orientable surfaces, and Whitney's embedding theorem. Suitable for advanced undergraduate courses in introductory or differential topology, this volume also serves as a supplementary text in advanced calculus and physics courses, as well as a key source of information for students of mechanics.
The book probes such phenomena as the begging of nesting birds, alarm calls in squirrels and primates, carotenoid coloration in fish and birds, the calls of frogs and toads, and weapon displays in crustaceans. Do these signals convey accurate information about the signaler, its future behavior, or its environment? Or do they mislead receivers in a way that benefits the signaler? For example, is the begging chick really hungry as its cries indicate or is it lobbying to get more food than its brothers and sisters?
Searcy and Nowicki take on these and other questions by developing clear definitions of key issues, by reviewing the most relevant empirical data and game theory models available, and by asking how well theory matches data. They find that animal communication is largely reliable--but that this basic reliability also allows the clever deceiver to flourish. Well researched and clearly written, their book provides new insight into animal communication, behavior, and evolution.
Thematically organized into eight parts, the book covers key topics in these main areas:
* theoretical developments in general dynamic and differential games
* pursuit-evasion games
* numerical approaches to dynamic and differential games
* applications of dynamic games in economics and option pricing
* search games
* evolutionary games
* stopping games
* stochastic games and "large neighborhood" games
A unified collection of state-of-the-art advances in theoretical and numerical analysis of dynamic games and their applications, the work is suitable for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.
The book addresses two major research goals: how to identify a given game as a potential game, and how to design the utility functions and the potential functions with certain special properties in order to formulate a potential game. After proposing a unifying mathematical framework for the identification of potential games, the text surveys existing applications of this technique within wireless communications and networking problems found in OFDMA 3G/4G/WiFi networks, as well as next-generation systems such as cognitive radios and dynamic spectrum access networks.
Professionals interested in understanding the theoretical aspect of this specialized field will find Potential Game Theory a valuable resource, as will advanced-level engineering students. It paves the way for extensive and rigorous research exploration on a topic whose capacity for practical applications is vast but not yet fully exploited.
As part of the opinion forming sector (as a think tank researcher and opinion editorial writer) Roger Bate has contributed to this information exchange. His writing over the past five years, as reflected in this book, has focussed on 5 key themes:
1. Hazards are as likely to come from natural as from man-made substances.
2. The linear no-threshold hypothesis is rubbish (i.e. the dose makes the poison).
3. An entire industry has developed to scare us into stopping certain activities, or making us feel guilty for continuing them, or lobbying to have them banned by government.
4. The public are quite capable of making decisions that involve complex trade-offs if only we would let them; indeed not letting them causes enormous problems as government bodies do not have the dispersed knowledge to do this, and are subject to interest group pressure.
5. There are innumerable benefits, as well as costs, from risk taking.
Most articles concerning risk avoid mentioning any of the above five themes.
The articles for this book were originally published in the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Economic Affairs, and The Sunday Times. An introduction will draw all the articles together.