* Beautifully illustrated with images relating to James’ life and works
* Detailed introductions to the major texts
* All the published books by William James, with individual contents tables
* Features rare essays appearing for the first time in digital publishing, including the posthumous collection: ‘Collected Essays and Reviews’
* Images of how the books were first published, giving your eReader a taste of the original texts
* Excellent formatting of the texts, with original footnotes
* Special chronological and alphabetical contents tables for the essays
* Easily locate the essays you want to read
* Includes James’ letters – spend hours exploring the philosopher’s personal correspondence
* Features James’ brother Henry’s seminal biography ‘Notes of a Son and Brother’
* Scholarly ordering of texts into chronological order and genres
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The Principles of Psychology
Psychology (Briefer Course)
The Will to Believe and Other Essays
Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals
The Varieties of Religious Experience
A Pluralistic Universe
The Meaning of Truth
Some Problems of Philosophy
Memories and Studies
Essays in Radical Empiricism
Collected Essays and Reviews
List of Essays in Chronological Order
List of Essays in Alphabetical Order
The Letters of William James
Notes of a Son and Brother by Henry James
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William James, a longtime student of the US Constitution, relies on James Madison, its recognized father, as well as Alexander Hamilton and John Jay to reveal the documents true meaning in this detailed analysis.
James reveals what the Founding Fathers really intended the Constitution to do, and he also shares forgotten truths, such as:
Natural born means that a child is born from parents who are both citizens of the United States.
The Second Amendment simply recognizes two unalienable rights; one is the right of free states to organize a militia, and the other is the right of citizens to keep and bear arms.
Franklin Roosevelts New Deal is believed by many to have prolonged and exacerbated the Great Depression. More importantly, the New Deal was unconstitutional.
James also explores how politicians consistently come up short in applying constitutional principles and how lawyers deliberately confuse people about the Constitutions meaning.
Stop accepting what politicians say at face value, and empower yourself with the knowledge you need to stand up for your rights with The Constitution and What It Means.
Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should call it that of radical empiricism, in spite of the fact that such brief nicknames are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy. I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square. The difference between monism and pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy. Primâ facie the world is a pluralism; as we find it, its unity seems to be that of any collection; and our higher thinking consists chiefly of an effort to redeem it from that first crude form. Postulating more unity than the first experiences yield, we also discover more. But absolute unity, in spite of brilliant dashes in its direction, still remains undiscovered, still remains a Grenzbegriff. "Ever not quite" must be the rationalistic philosopher's last confession concerning it. After all that reason can do has been done, there still remains the opacity of the finite facts as merely given, with most of their peculiarities mutually unmediated and unexplained. To the very last, there are the various 'points of view' which the philosopher must distinguish in discussing the world; and what is inwardly clear from one point remains a bare externality and datum to the other. The negative, the alogical, is never wholly banished. Something—"call it fate, chance, freedom, spontaneity, the devil, what you will"—is still wrong and other and outside and unincluded, from your point of view, even though you be the greatest of philosophers.
‘Thoughts’ and ‘things’ are names for two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other. Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her explanations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future. At first, ‘spirit and matter,’ ‘soul and body,’ stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance. The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. In the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, Münsterberg—at any rate in his earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the ‘content’ of experience is known. It loses personal form and activity—these passing over to the content—and becomes a bare Bewusstheit or Bewusstsein überhaupt, of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said.
I believe that ‘consciousness,’ when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ‘soul’ upon the air of philosophy. During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of consciousness, and substituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors. But they were not quite radical enough, not quite daring enough in their negations. For twenty years past I have mistrusted ‘consciousness’ as an entity; for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.