The book is the first of its kind to include and evaluate the effects of the global financial crisis on the process of EU financial integration. In particular, the book’s contributors address the issue of whether a high degree of financial integration contributed to the intensification of the financial crisis, or whether a low level of integration prevented countries and financial industries from some of the negative effects of the crisis. Although most of the chapters apply contemporary econometric tools, the technical part is always reduced to indispensable minimum and the emphasis is given to economic interpretation of the results. The book aims to offer an up to date and insightful examination of the process of financial integration in the EU today.
Sharply and clearly argued, Wolf’s prescription for fixing global finance illustrates why he has been described as "the world's preeminent financial journalist."
Currency wars are one of the most destructive and feared outcomes in international economics. At best, they offer the sorry spectacle of countries' stealing growth from their trading partners. At worst, they degenerate into sequential bouts of inflation, recession, retaliation, and sometimes actual violence. Left unchecked, the next currency war could lead to a crisis worse than the panic of 2008.
Currency wars have happened before-twice in the last century alone-and they always end badly. Time and again, paper currencies have collapsed, assets have been frozen, gold has been confiscated, and capital controls have been imposed. And the next crash is overdue. Recent headlines about the debasement of the dollar, bailouts in Greece and Ireland, and Chinese currency manipulation are all indicators of the growing conflict.
As James Rickards argues in Currency Wars, this is more than just a concern for economists and investors. The United States is facing serious threats to its national security, from clandestine gold purchases by China to the hidden agendas of sovereign wealth funds. Greater than any single threat is the very real danger of the collapse of the dollar itself.
Baffling to many observers is the rank failure of economists to foresee or prevent the economic catastrophes of recent years. Not only have their theories failed to prevent calamity, they are making the currency wars worse. The U. S. Federal Reserve has engaged in the greatest gamble in the history of finance, a sustained effort to stimulate the economy by printing money on a trillion-dollar scale. Its solutions present hidden new dangers while resolving none of the current dilemmas.
While the outcome of the new currency war is not yet certain, some version of the worst-case scenario is almost inevitable if U.S. and world economic leaders fail to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors. Rickards untangles the web of failed paradigms, wishful thinking, and arrogance driving current public policy and points the way toward a more informed and effective course of action.
Jean Tirole first analyzes the current views on the crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Reform proposals often treat the symptoms rather than the fundamentals, he argues, and sometimes fail to reconcile the objectives of setting effective financing conditions while ensuring that a country "owns" its reform program. A proper identification of market failures is essential to reformulating the mission of an institution such as the IMF, he emphasizes. Next he adapts the basic principles of corporate governance, liquidity provision, and risk management of corporations to the particulars of country borrowing. Building on a "dual- and common-agency perspective," he revisits commonly advocated policies and considers how multilateral organizations can help debtor countries reap enhanced benefits while liberalizing their capital accounts.
Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policymakers, and students at all levels will find indispensable.
In this personal account, Djankov details his odyssey on the front lines, observing Europe's fitful efforts to contain crises in Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, and France. He tells the inside story of how the European Central Bank assumed responsibility for the crisis, pledging to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro area. This candid book recounts the disagreements over fiscal austerity, monetary policy, and banking supervision, while focusing on the personalities who promoted progress—and those who opposed it. He also tells the dramatic story of the events that led to his own resignation as finance minister in 2013 over the policies he was pursuing to spare Bulgaria from getting sucked into the crisis.
Jörg Bibow presents Keynes’ liquidity preference theory as a distinctive and highly relevant approach to monetary theory offering a conceptual framework of general applicability for explaining the role and functioning of the financial system. He argues that, in a dynamic context, liquidity preference theory may best be understood as a theory of financial intermediation. Through applications to current events and prominent hypotheses in global finance, this book underlines the richness, continued relevance, and superiority of Keynes’ theory of liquidity preference; with Hyman Minsky standing out for developing Keynes’ vision of financial capitalism.
This book is unified by the view that the financial sector had been a self-serving and self-regulating elite consumed by greed, speculation and even lawlessness, with little sense of responsibility to the wider society or common good. In light of critical analysis by authors from a variety of backgrounds and persuasions, suggestions for reform and improvement are proposed, in some cases radical reform. By placing the world of finance under a microscope, this book analyses the assumptions that have led from hubris to disgrace as it provides suggestions for an improved society.
Rooted in philosophical reflection, this book invites a critical reassessment of finance and its societal role in the 21st century. This book will be of interest to academics, politicians, central bankers and financial regulators who wish to improve the morality of finance.
This book analyses ten of the most important financial crises of the last thirty years. The specific crises covered in the book are the 1982 Chilean crisis, the 1992 ERM crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 1999 Brazilian crisis, the 1999 Ecuadorian crisis, the 2000 Turkish crisis, the 2002 Argentine crisis, and the 2008 crisis in Iceland. The set includes the most important emerging-market crises of the last three decades as well as two particularly informative advanced-country crises, the ERM crisis of 1992 and the Icelandic crisis of 2008. A separate chapter is devoted to each crisis, and a brief concluding chapter sums up some of the key lessons that I believe that we can draw from these events.
This book uses the discipline of socio-analysis to explore the meaning of money, markets and the broad financial world that so strongly affects our daily lives. Socio-analysis contributes to an awareness and understanding of underlying unconscious desires, fantasies and illusions that bring about the irrational inflation of faith and trust in the world of money, finance and capital(ism). The insight that the financial crisis ‘was essentially psychological in origin’ (Robert Shiller) and that the world of finance is broadly shaped if not determined by irrational often unconscious factors is not yet broadly shared. This book appears to be one of the first, if not the first contribution that explicitly focuses on what is beneath the surface of money, finance and capital. It invites the reader to explore the financial world in depth.
The aim of this book is to provide businesses, organizational consultants, students, researchers and interested persons more broadly with a detailed exploration of the psycho-social dynamics of the financial industry as it exists currently within the capitalist system. The contributors to this book come from Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, The Netherlands, UK, and USA.
This book introduces and explains a relatively new concept in competition measurement: the performance-conduct-structure (PCS) indicator. The key idea behind this measure is that a firm’s efficiency is more highly rewarded in terms of market share and profit, the stronger competitive pressure is. The book begins by explaining the financial market’s fundamental obstacles to competition presenting a brief survey of the complex relationship between financial stability and competition. The theoretical contributions of Hay and Liu and Boone provide the theoretical underpinning for the PCS indicator, while its application to banking and insurance illustrates its empirical qualities. Finally, this book presents a systematic comparison between the results of this approach and (all) existing methods as applied to 46 countries, over the same sample period.
This book presents a comprehensive overview of the knowns and unknowns of financial sector competition for commercial and central bankers, policy-makers, supervisors and academics alike.
Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia
The conventional wisdom blames unbridled markets for mortgage fraud, imprudent risks, and extreme leverage in financial institutions. Policy makers told us that the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the near failure of American International Group and many large banks, would have resulted in catastrophic decline and perhaps another Great Depression. After the crisis, thousands of pages of new regulations were written to limit the types of risk banks can take and the kinds of investments they can make so that a financial crisis of this magnitude can’t happen again. But what if this conventional wisdom was wrong?
If the problem wasn’t unregulated, unrestrained markets leading to fraud and excessive risk-taking, if instead it was perverted incentives and distorted market signals due to numerous regulations and mandates in the first place, then the thousands of new pages of regulations haven’t solved the fundamental problem. In fact, they have made it worse. This book shows that it is time to reassess the conventional wisdom. Perhaps there is still time to reverse the faulty solutions based upon it before another financial crisis breaks out.
The main topics explored are the complex nature of the crisis, the short circuit between policies and the given institutional architecture, the controversial role of Germany, and the importance of an active role of the US. The book brings together a transatlantic group of scholars in order to offer an interdisciplinary analysis of the deep causes of the Eurozone distress. The authors recognize that the Eurozone countries have contrasting situations and interests and face different problems with complex consequences for the vexed question of national sovereignty within the EU; and pay attention to the social and political consequences of the economic and financial distress and of the perceived strain of the common currency.
Most current studies on capital flows are empirical work, which faces various challenges. The challenges include how data has been collected and measured in each country and how sensitive the results are to the data and the adopted methodologies. Moreover, the links between capital flows and banking systems have been neglected. This book helps provide some insight into the challenges faced by empirical studies and the lessons of the recent crises. The book develops theoretical analysis to deepen our understanding on how capital flows, banking systems and financial markets are linked with each other and provides constructive policy implications by overcoming the empirical challenges.