the announced Cathero High Commissioner, the French and the Commander in Chief in the East representative of the Government of FranceFree independence of Syria in the 27 \ September \ 1941 when Sheikh Taj al-Din al-Husseini Presidency of the Republic, and the United States issued on 29 \ November \ 1941 statement confirmed the sympathy with the aspirations of the natural and legitimate for Syria
The approach of U.S. policy toward Syria over the past 1943-1945 and carried out by France acts of abuse and bombing and tied inhumane with the population, and the rejection of the French policy of this and discuss the developments in Syria, independence and participation in the UN within the framework of the decisions in the context of international interests and international competition.
Syria Station attention by decision-makers in the United States for its strategic location and the passage of pipelines transporting oil, and followed up minutes of the ongoing developments in which a researcher for securing their own interests and the interests of its citizens and its institutions and cultural missionary and archaeological,
The crisis was prompted by the Eisenhower administration's decision not to fund the Aswan High Dam, triggering the takeover of the Suez Canal Company by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Responding to events, the American government imposed economic sanctions against Great Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel, with varying degrees of success.
Because of its weakened financial position and misguided decisions, Kunz says, the government of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden proved most vulnerable to these tactics. Indeed, American economic pressure caused the British government to withdraw its troops ignominiously from Egypt. France, on the other hand, had borrowed sufficiently prior to the crisis to be able to withstand American pressure. For Israel, Kunz says, the threat of sanctions symbolized the Eisenhower administration's wrath. Israel could forego American funds, but, dependent on the goodwill of a great power for survival, it could not take a stand that would completely alienate the United States. Only Egypt proved immune to financial warfare.
Kunz also illuminates the general diplomacy of the Suez crisis. The American government was determined neither to alienate moderate Arab opinion nor to become too closely intertwined with Israel. As such, this account has significant lessons for American policy.
Originally published in 1991.
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