From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. at War in Afghanistan and Iraq

Naval Institute Press
Free sample

From Kabul to Baghdad and Back provides insight into the key strategic decisions of the Afghan and Iraq campaigns as the United States attempted to wage both simultaneously against al-Qaeda and its supporting affiliates. It also evaluates the strategic execution of those military campaigns to identify how well the two operations were conducted in light of their political objectives. The book identifies the elements that made the 2001 military operation to oust the Taliban successful, then with combat operations in Iraq as a standard of comparison, the authors analyze the remainder of the Afghan campaign and the essential problems that plagued that effort, from the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, through the ill-fated transition to NATO lead in Afghanistan in 2006, the dismissal of Generals McKiernan and McChrystal, the eventual decision by President Obama to make the Afghan campaign the main effort in the war on extremism, and the final development of drawdown plans following the end of the war in Iraq. No other book successfully compares and contrasts the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective, analyzing the impact of fighting the Iraq War on the success of the United States campaign in Afghanistan. It is also the first book to specifically question several key operational decisions in Afghanistan including: the decision to give NATO the lead in Afghanistan, the decisions to fire Generals McKiernan and McChrystal and the decision to conduct an Iraq War-style surge in Afghanistan. It also compares the Afghan campaigns fought by the Soviet Union and the United States, the counterinsurgency campaigns styles in Iraq and Afghanistan and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the final chapter, the key lessons of the two campaigns are outlined, including the importance of effective strategic decision-making, the utility of population focused counterinsurgency practices, the challenges of building partner capacity during combat, and the mindset required to prosecute modern war.
Read more

About the author

John R. Ballard, Ph.D. is Dean of Faculty and Academic Programs at the National War College, David W. Lamm is the Deputy Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and John K. Wood is an Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies – all at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.
Read more
Loading...

Additional Information

Publisher
Naval Institute Press
Read more
Published on
Oct 12, 2012
Read more
Pages
384
Read more
ISBN
9781612511689
Read more
Language
English
Read more
Genres
History / Military / Afghan War (2001-)
Read more
Content Protection
This content is DRM protected.
Read more
Read Aloud
Available on Android devices
Read more

Reading information

Smartphones and Tablets

Install the Google Play Books app for Android and iPad/iPhone. It syncs automatically with your account and allows you to read online or offline wherever you are.

Laptops and Computers

You can read books purchased on Google Play using your computer's web browser.

eReaders and other devices

To read on e-ink devices like the Sony eReader or Barnes & Noble Nook, you'll need to download a file and transfer it to your device. Please follow the detailed Help center instructions to transfer the files to supported eReaders.
Covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom as two campaigns within a single, if discontinuous, conflict, this book analyzes the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2010 and the key operational decisions that determined the course of the war. The author’s assessment of the long war against Iraq includes misunderstandings between government leaders in Iraq and the United States that led initially to war, ineffective UN sanctions, inefficient efforts by the Clinton administration, and uncoordinated actions by the Bush administration that then led to a preemptive strategy, continuation of conventional combat, and the evolution of an Iraqi insurgency.

Ballard’s thorough examination of these multiple operations within the context of a single conflict provides readers with rare and insightful perspectives on the complexity of modern war and the challenges of operational command. He first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990 and then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture that dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequent chapters examine the conduct of Desert Storm from the American and Iraqi perspectives and the military, economic, and diplomatic actions of the period between the two conventional campaigns. Final chapters analyze the 2003 offensive on Baghdad, the postwar stabilization operations that began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the eventual implementation of a warfighting strategy that combined new doctrine and a surge of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. A concluding chapter reviews key lessons for the future, including the importance of effective strategic decision making and the operational mindset required to prosecute modern war successfully.
This instant New York Times bestseller—“a jaw-dropping, fast-paced account” (New York Post) recounts SEAL Team Operator Robert O’Neill’s incredible four-hundred-mission career, including the attempts to rescue “Lone Survivor” Marcus Luttrell and abducted-by-Somali-pirates Captain Richard Phillips, and which culminated in the death of the world’s most wanted terrorist—Osama bin Laden.

In The Operator, Robert O’Neill describes his idyllic childhood in Butte, Montana; his impulsive decision to join the SEALs; the arduous evaluation and training process; and the even tougher gauntlet he had to run to join the SEALs’ most elite unit. After officially becoming a SEAL, O’Neill would spend more than a decade in the most intense counterterror effort in US history. For extended periods, not a night passed without him and his small team recording multiple enemy kills—and though he was lucky enough to survive, several of the SEALs he’d trained with and fought beside never made it home.

“Impossible to put down…The Operator is unique, surprising, a kind of counternarrative, and certainly the other half of the story of one of the world’s most famous military operations…In the larger sense, this book is about…how to be human while in the very same moment dealing with death, destruction, combat” (Doug Stanton, New York Times bestselling author). O’Neill describes the nonstop action of his deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, evokes the black humor of years-long combat, brings to vivid life the lethal efficiency of the military’s most selective units, and reveals details of the most celebrated terrorist takedown in history. This is “a riveting, unvarnished, and wholly unforgettable portrait of America’s most storied commandos at war” (Joby Warrick).
Covering both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom as two campaigns within a single, if discontinuous, conflict, this book analyzes the strategic interaction between Iraq and the United States from 1990 to 2010 and the key operational decisions that determined the course of the war. The author’s assessment of the long war against Iraq includes misunderstandings between government leaders in Iraq and the United States that led initially to war, ineffective UN sanctions, inefficient efforts by the Clinton administration, and uncoordinated actions by the Bush administration that then led to a preemptive strategy, continuation of conventional combat, and the evolution of an Iraqi insurgency.

Ballard’s thorough examination of these multiple operations within the context of a single conflict provides readers with rare and insightful perspectives on the complexity of modern war and the challenges of operational command. He first identifies the influence of the Vietnam era on the use of U.S. military power and the decision for war in 1990 and then outlines the important factors of Iraqi history and culture that dominated relations between the two nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Subsequent chapters examine the conduct of Desert Storm from the American and Iraqi perspectives and the military, economic, and diplomatic actions of the period between the two conventional campaigns. Final chapters analyze the 2003 offensive on Baghdad, the postwar stabilization operations that began with the failure to transition under the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the eventual implementation of a warfighting strategy that combined new doctrine and a surge of forces to protect the population in a renewed counterinsurgency campaign. A concluding chapter reviews key lessons for the future, including the importance of effective strategic decision making and the operational mindset required to prosecute modern war successfully.
©2018 GoogleSite Terms of ServicePrivacyDevelopersArtistsAbout Google|Location: United StatesLanguage: English (United States)
By purchasing this item, you are transacting with Google Payments and agreeing to the Google Payments Terms of Service and Privacy Notice.