Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.
This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.
The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
This book is a comprehensive analysis of an air force, the Luftwaffe, in World War II. It follows the Germans from their prewar preparations to their final defeat. There are many disturbing parallels with our current situation. I urge every student of military science to read it carefully. The lessons of the nature of warfare and the application of airpower can provide the guidance to develop our fighting forces and employment concepts to meet the significant challenges we are certain to face in the future.
War has a tradition of changing the social and economic map of a country. The concept of family was completely torn apart with the widespread devastation of the Second World War.
This book looks at the experiences of six people from various sectors involved in this global conflict - in the aftermath of the extraordinary Second World War.
The Vietnam War was fought like a war and it ended with both sides believing that they won. But it was not a war that started with a formal declaration of war.
The number of struggles for power that are part of the fabric of Vietnam is almost overwhelming.
The battles were short and intense and fought in the jungles and rice paddies. Much of the war involved guerilla attacks.
Scott’s Other Books:**Unforgettable World War II: Aftermath of the Extraordinary Second World War
**Hitler's War and the Horrific Account of the Holocaust On the Brink of Nuclear War: Cuban Missile Crisis - Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States
**The Forgotten Heroes: Untold Stories of the Extraordinary World War II - Courage, Survival, Resistance and Rescue.
**The Forgotten Women Heroes: Second World War Untold Stories - The Women Heroes in the Extraordinary World War Two.
In discussing the general question of military intelligence in time of war, the author starts from the undisputed premise that information of the enemy is absolutely essential and must be available in time for use. In any situation there are three factors involved; namely: 1.) the mission as laid down or deduced; 2.) the possibilities which our forces can execute; 3.) the possibilities which the enemy can execute. Colonel Bernis expertly illustrates his conception of how military intelligence should be handled by examples drawn from the Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War of 1870, and the First World War.
This study analyzes the Okinawa Campaign, Operation ICEBERG, using the operational operating systems as a framework for assessing how well the Tenth Army conducted the campaign and for determining what lessons are applicable to joint operations at the field army level.
This study first traces the historical background of field armies in the twentieth century and shows that every major conflict has included combat operations at this level. It then outlines the operational operating systems as defined in TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9. Before actually analyzing the campaign, the study provides a battle summary of the Okinawa Campaign which provides the basis for analysis.
The study then looks at the campaign through each of the six operational operating systems to determine how Tenth Army planned for the operation, how well it performed, and what lessons can be extracted and applied to today’s joint operational requirements.
Although Okinawa was the largest joint operation of the war, it was not the largest planned joint operation. Operation DOWNFALL, the campaign to seize the Japanese islands, was the largest planned. So Okinawa was really a test of how joint operations at the large unit level could be conducted. Although the war ended prior to the invasion of Japan, the lessons the US Military learned in executing ICEBERG are still relevant and still provide insight into how joint operations should be conducted at the field army level.
The structure of this monograph is to explain the nature of LIC and assess its impact on reconnaissance forces, describe a comparison methodology, conduct historical analysis, analyze the results of the comparison, and then to make conclusions and offer recommendations. The information collection effort was focused on primary source reports from the Army, Marine, and British Army commanders involved, directed research analysis, and personal interviews.
LIC is not new to the American Army. Our Army has been involved in insurgencies both in and out of country from its creation. The Army has fought in numerous insurgencies, however, its involvements in the Philippines, Mexico, Dominican Republic, and Grenada are studied as are the U.S. Marine Corps interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti and the British Army’s actions in Malaya and Kenya. These insurgencies were fought in different environmental settings, against different types of insurgents, by different intervening nations. These examples are too few to provide an accurate data base for statistical analysis; however, they provide enough diverse information for comparative analysis by comparing the missions that were assigned to the reconnaissance units involved.
“IN the summer of 1921 I was lunching at the Restaurant la Rue with the Deputy Chief of the French General staff when he told me the following story:
At the battle of Waterloo, Colonel Clement, an infantry commander, fought with the most conspicuous bravery; but unfortunately was shot through the head. Napoleon, hearing of his gallantry and misfortune, gave instructions for him to be carried into a farm where Larrey the surgeon-general was operating.
One glance convinced Larrey that his case was desperate, so taking up a saw he removed the top of his skull and placed his brains on the table.
Just as he had finished, in rushed an aide-de-camp, shouting: ‘Is General Clement here?’
Clement, hearing him, sat up and exclaimed: ‘No! but Colonel Clement is.’
‘Oh, mon général,’ cried the aide-de-camp, embracing him, ‘the Emperor was overwhelmed when we heard of your gallantry, and has promoted you on the field of battle to the rank of General,’
Clement rubbed his eyes, got off the table, clapped the top of his skull on his head and was about to leave the farm, when Larrey shouted after him: ‘Mon général—your brains!’ To which the gallant Frenchman, increasing his speed, shouted back: ‘Now that I am a general I shall no longer require them!’
In this modest study, my object is to prove that, though Clement was wrong about brains, without his courage there can be no true generalship.”-Foreword.