On Sept. 14, 2001, Pres. Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under Sect. 12302 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Pres. is allowed to call up to 1 million Nat. Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. The GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following 9/11. GAO examined (1) whether the DoD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces; (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process; and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. Also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98% of non-retired reservists, were available. Makes recommendations.
The Army's strategy for training its reserve component (RC) calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. This report assessed the extent to which: (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training RC forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, reg¿s., and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to mil. schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of RC forces.
As a result of problems with several special operations missions in the 1980s, including the failed attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in April 1980, Congress created a joint special operations command in 1987 to ensure the readiness of assigned forces. This report assesses how the command determines its force level and mix of active and reserve forces and examines issues affecting the readiness of special operations forces. Charts and tables.
In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special operations capability under a single command. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with the mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces to DOD s geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct certain functions relating to special operations activities whether or not they relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned forces; and monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers. In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be responsible for the following activities as they relate to special operations: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) psychological operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 9 Appendix II defines these activities assigned to the Special Operations Command. DOD has also assigned additional activities to the Special Operations Command.
Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.
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