On Sept. 14, 2001, Pres. Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under Sect. 12302 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Pres. is allowed to call up to 1 million Nat. Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. The GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following 9/11. GAO examined (1) whether the DoD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces; (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process; and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. Also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98% of non-retired reservists, were available. Makes recommendations.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Stop Loss (SL) is a DoD program that retains servicemembers (SM) beyond their contractually agreed-to separation date. Some critics have referred to the program as a ¿backdoor draft¿ or ¿involuntary servitude¿. Contents of this report: What is SL?; What is the Mil. Obligation for SM?; What is the Authority for SL?; How Has SL Been Used by the Services?; What is the Impact of SL on Individual Soldiers?; Why Deploy Units Rather Than Individuals?; Has There Been Recent Legislation Regarding the SL Program?; Has SL Had an Impact on Recruiting?; Has SL Improved Unit Readiness?; Does SL Have Any Impact on End Strength?; Has ¿Grow the Army¿ Reduced the Need for SL?; Suspension of SL.; Retroactive SL Pay.; Army SL Totals by Month (Enlisted Only).
Over 335,000 reserve members have been involuntarily called to active duty since 9/11. This report reviews DoD's mobilization & demobilization (M&D) process. Examines the extent to which: (1) DoD's implementation of a key mobilization authority & personnel policies affect reserve force availability, (2) the Army was able to execute its M&D plans efficiently, & (3) DoD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces. DoD should develop a strategic framework with personnel policies linked to human capital goals, update planning assumptions, determine the most efficient mobilization support options, update health guidance, set a timeline for submitting health assessments electronically, & improve medical oversight. Charts & tables.
The Army's strategy for training its reserve component (RC) calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. This report assessed the extent to which: (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training RC forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, reg¿s., and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to mil. schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of RC forces.
The nation has difficult trade-offs in facing calls on Army forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report describes the effects of large deployments on the Army's ability to provide forces for other contingencies, to ensure that soldiers are trained, and to continue to recruit and retain soldiers. The authors found that Army plans for transformation and employing reserves at reasonable rates still fall short. Steps to improve the situation all involve high risks or costs. Unless requirements recede, the nation faces an Army stretched thin, with no quick fix or easy solution.
Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.
The Department of Defense has suggested that "blending" active component and reserve component workforces in military units must be implemented more broadly to better capitalize on the capabilities and strengths of the reserve components, thus leading to a more flexible, capable force. RAND researchers examined existing organizational designs that facilitate integration of the reserve and active workforces to ascertain whether changed personnel management practices are needed to help implement those organizational designs. They reviewed service reports and directives and other relevant literature on the subject, including the organizational change literature, and interviewed service officials and subject matter experts. They conclude that workforce integration efforts aimed at improving operational accomplishment of mission, balancing operations tempo, and increasing capital asset utilization would be more successful than efforts aimed at other goals, such as resolving personnel management differences. The authors recommend that adapting what works within a service to other functional areas in the service is a better near-term workforce integration strategy than replicating forms of integration across services; that the services should provide policy guidance for workforce integration; and that the services should consider performing more evaluation of workforce integration against the goals they have set out for it.
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