The Army's strategy for training its reserve component (RC) calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. This report assessed the extent to which: (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training RC forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, reg¿s., and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to mil. schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of RC forces.
Since Sept. 2001, the Army Nat. Guard (ANG) has experienced the largest activation of its members since WW2. In 2005, over 30% of the Army forces in Iraq were ANG members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the ANG forces has raised concerns about whether it can perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the ANG is seeking additional funding for emergency equip. This testimony discusses: (1) the changing role of the ANG; (2) whether the ANG has the equip. it needs to sustain fed. and state missions; and (3) the extent to which DoD has strategies and plans to improve the ANG¿s business model for the future.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Stop Loss (SL) is a DoD program that retains servicemembers (SM) beyond their contractually agreed-to separation date. Some critics have referred to the program as a ¿backdoor draft¿ or ¿involuntary servitude¿. Contents of this report: What is SL?; What is the Mil. Obligation for SM?; What is the Authority for SL?; How Has SL Been Used by the Services?; What is the Impact of SL on Individual Soldiers?; Why Deploy Units Rather Than Individuals?; Has There Been Recent Legislation Regarding the SL Program?; Has SL Had an Impact on Recruiting?; Has SL Improved Unit Readiness?; Does SL Have Any Impact on End Strength?; Has ¿Grow the Army¿ Reduced the Need for SL?; Suspension of SL.; Retroactive SL Pay.; Army SL Totals by Month (Enlisted Only).
In 1986, the Congress called for the establishment of a joint service special operations capability under a single command. In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense established the Special Operations Command with the mission to provide trained and combat-ready special operations forces to DOD s geographic combatant commands. Section 167(e) of Title 10, U.S. Code directs that the Commander of the Special Operations Command be responsible for and have the authority to conduct all affairs of such command related to special operations activities. Under this section, the Commander is also responsible for and has the authority to conduct certain functions relating to special operations activities whether or not they relate to the Special Operations Command, including: preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to the Special Operations Command; exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds; training assigned forces; and monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers. In addition, Section 167 directs the Special Operations Command to be responsible for the following activities as they relate to special operations: (1) direct action, (2) strategic reconnaissance, (3) unconventional warfare, (4) foreign internal defense, (5) civil affairs, (6) psychological operations, (7) counterterrorism, (8) humanitarian assistance, (9) theater search and rescue, and (10) other activities such as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 9 Appendix II defines these activities assigned to the Special Operations Command. DOD has also assigned additional activities to the Special Operations Command.
As a result of problems with several special operations missions in the 1980s, including the failed attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in April 1980, Congress created a joint special operations command in 1987 to ensure the readiness of assigned forces. This report assesses how the command determines its force level and mix of active and reserve forces and examines issues affecting the readiness of special operations forces. Charts and tables.
The term ¿Reserve Component¿ is used to refer collectively to the seven individual reserve components of the armed forces: the Army Nat. Guard (NG), the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air NG, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. These reserve components ¿provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces.¿ Since 1990, reservists have been involuntarily activated six times, incl. two large-scale mobilizations for the Persian Gulf War and in the aftermath of 9/11. This increasing use of the reserves has led to interest in funding, equipment, and personnel policy. This report provides an overview of key reserve component personnel issues. This is a print on demand report.
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