On Sept. 14, 2001, Pres. Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under Sect. 12302 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Pres. is allowed to call up to 1 million Nat. Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. The GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following 9/11. GAO examined (1) whether the DoD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces; (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process; and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. Also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98% of non-retired reservists, were available. Makes recommendations.
The nation has difficult trade-offs in facing calls on Army forces for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report describes the effects of large deployments on the Army's ability to provide forces for other contingencies, to ensure that soldiers are trained, and to continue to recruit and retain soldiers. The authors found that Army plans for transformation and employing reserves at reasonable rates still fall short. Steps to improve the situation all involve high risks or costs. Unless requirements recede, the nation faces an Army stretched thin, with no quick fix or easy solution.
Compares prior estimates of the size of an occupation force that the U.S. military can sustain in Iraq with the military¿s actual practice up to Oct. 2005. The DoD made policy decisions that increased its ability to sustain a larger occupation force compared with a previous estimate. That includes terminating the U.S. military mission in Bosnia, reducing the U.S. presence in NE Asia, and adopting more demanding goals for how rapidly U.S. forces should rotate through extended deployments. The major difference between the size of an occupation force in Iraq 2003-10/05 and the estimate of the size of a sustainable force derives from DoD¿s practice of deploying active- and reserve-component units at rates in excess of what are considered sustainable. Illus.
Since Sept. 2001, the Army Nat. Guard (ANG) has experienced the largest activation of its members since WW2. In 2005, over 30% of the Army forces in Iraq were ANG members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the ANG forces has raised concerns about whether it can perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the ANG is seeking additional funding for emergency equip. This testimony discusses: (1) the changing role of the ANG; (2) whether the ANG has the equip. it needs to sustain fed. and state missions; and (3) the extent to which DoD has strategies and plans to improve the ANG¿s business model for the future.
As a result of problems with several special operations missions in the 1980s, including the failed attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran in April 1980, Congress created a joint special operations command in 1987 to ensure the readiness of assigned forces. This report assesses how the command determines its force level and mix of active and reserve forces and examines issues affecting the readiness of special operations forces. Charts and tables.
The Army's strategy for training its reserve component (RC) calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. This report assessed the extent to which: (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training RC forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, reg¿s., and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to mil. schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of RC forces.
The attacks on September 11th, 2001 began the Global War on Terror and resulted in the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of reservists. These mobilizations are expected to continue at their current pace for the foreseeable future. This increase in workload for a part-time force structure must come at a cost. As more frequent and lengthy reserve obligations put stress on soldiers, families, and employers, these volunteers are being forced into a decision between service to nation and family/careers. Recognition of the potential effects on the reserves now will enable timely policy or force structure changes to ward off disaster and prepare the military forces for success when the nation needs them the most.
The Commission was chartered by Congress to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that the National Guard and other reserve components are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. nat. security. Contents: Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve; Enhancing the DoD¿s Role in the Homeland; Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Mgmt. for an Integrated Total Force; Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve; Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support an Operational Reserve; and Commission for the Total Operational Force. Illus.
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