A New Nuclear Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control

Greenwood Publishing Group
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Cimbala and Scouras examine the issues related to the control of nuclear weapons in the early 21st century. These issues are both technical and policy oriented; science and values are commingled. This means that arguments about nuclear strategy, arms control, and proliferation are apt to be contentious and confusing. The authors seek to provide readers with a fuller, more accurate understanding of the issues involved.

They begin by analyzing the crazy mathematics of nuclear arms races and arms control that preoccupied analysts and policymakers during the Cold War. After examining stability modeling, they argue for a more comprehensive definition of strategic stability and they relate this more inclusive concept to the current relationship between the United States and Russia--one characterized by cooperation as well as competition. They then use the concept of friction to analyze how the gap between theory and practice might influence nuclear force operations and arms control. The problem of nuclear weapons spread or proliferation is then considered from the vantage point of both theory and policy. They conclude with an analysis of whether the United States might get by in the 21st century with fewer legs of its strategic nuclear triplet than weapons based on land, at sea, and airborne. A provocative analysis for arms control policymakers, strategists, and students, scholars, and other researchers involved with nuclear weapons issues.

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About the author

STEPHEN J. CIMBALA is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, Delaware County. His most recent books include Nuclear Strategy in the Twenty-first Century (Praeger, 2000) and Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in War and Military Policy (Praeger, 2001).

JAMES SCOURAS is a Principal Scientist at DynCorp National Security Programs.

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Additional Information

Publisher
Greenwood Publishing Group
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Published on
Dec 31, 2002
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Pages
189
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ISBN
9780275970611
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Language
English
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Genres
Political Science / International Relations / Arms Control
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Content Protection
This content is DRM protected.
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Available on Android devices
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Eligible for Family Library

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Why were the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union able to negotiate a series of arms control agreements despite the deep and important differences in their interests during the Cold War? Lisa A. Baglione considers a variety of explanations for the successes--and failures--of these negotiations drawn from international relations theories. Focusing on the goals and strategies of individual leaders--and their ability to make these the goals and strategies of their nation--the author develops a nuanced understanding that better explains the outcome of these negotiations. Baglione then tests her explanation in a consideration of negotiations surrounding the banning of above-ground nuclear tests, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s, the negotiations for the limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in the 1980s, and the last negotiations between the Americans and the disintegrating Soviet Union in 1990 and 1991. How these great rivals were able to negotiate significant arms control agreements not only will shed light on international relations during an important period of history but will help us understand how such agreements might develop in the post-Cold War period, when arms proliferation has become a serious problem.
This book will appeal to scholars of international relations and arms control as well as those interested in bargaining and international negotiations and contemporary military history.
Lisa A. Baglione is Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Joseph's University.
This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies.

The existing body of literature largely leans toward the analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence and it is often implicitly assumed that nuclear weapons are so important that, when they are present, other factors need not be studied. This book addresses this omission. It develops a research framework that incorporates the military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, together with various perceptual factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. This framework is then used to re-examine five historical crises that brought two nuclear countries to the brink of war: the hostile asymmetric nuclear relations between the United States and China in the early 1960s; between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s; between Israel and Iraq in 1977–1981; between the United States and North Korea in 1992–1994; and, finally, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main empirical findings challenge the common expectation that the threat of nuclear retaliation represents the ultimate deterrent. In fact, it can be said, with a high degree of confidence, that it was rather the threat of conventional retaliation that acted as a major stabilizer.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, cold war studies, deterrence theory, security studies and IR in general.

Global politics has changed with unaccustomed swiftness since the end of the Cold War. Eastern Europe is free; the Soviet Union has broken up; China presses free market economic reform; and the United States and Russia have declared a joint commitment to end nuclear war. The force of these changes has created a new agenda for global politics and security policy. This does not mean that nuclear weapons have lost their centrality. Nuclear development programs continue in the major holders of advanced weapons. In Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran nuclear intentions are subject to widespread speculation and scrutiny. Negotiations for renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remind us that the treaty requires serious efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. Nuclear Choices points out that the Cold War's end has not banished mistrust. Instead, it has opened the door to frank conversation about the usefulness of force and the need to address common fears.

States now face a global choice among alternative nuclear futures. If they desire to avoid runaway nuclear development, the choices come down to three: the status quo, disengagement, or abolition. Larkin argues that if they chose the status quo, they elect a world in which only terror and self-restraint keep devastation at bay, a world in which instant destruction is possible. This study focuses on the nuclear weapons programs of Great Britain, China, and France, because they may be less familiar to students of international affairs. Each of these countries has developed a substantial nuclear capability that could decisively shape the result of coming global nuclear decisions.

Larkin concludes that these three minipowers could conclude that nuclearism serves their interests, refuse disengagement, and encourage proliferation. If they are prepared to abandon nuclearism, they have tremendous political leverage on Russia, the United States, and also on undeclared and aspiring nuclear weapons states. For now, only the United Kingdom, France, and China maintain sufficient warhead inventories and production capabilities to have strong effects on how the United States and Russia view their own strategic capabilities. Nuclear Choices asserts that governments, polities, and parties today do not know how to guarantee themselves against weapons of mass destruction. They must either acquire the political and social means to achieve such guarantees or accept a world in which nuclearism will continue to cast its shadow over all aspects of nation building. It will be of interest to political scientists, policymakers, military analysts, and those interested hi the nuclear issue.

Cimbala analyzes military persuasion--the art of using armed force to support diplomacy, deterrence, crisis management, unconventional conflicts, peace operations, and other military activities short of major conventional war. As he shows, military persuasion requires that policy makers and diplomats understand the subtle interaction between force and diplomacy; each supports, or destroys, the other, depending upon the situation. Even conventional wars have aspects of armed persuasion. The Powell doctrine that calls for overwhelming force in case of any U.S. military intervention was not even employed by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the Gulf War of 1991, despite the popular impression to the contrary. Since U.S. policy is not based on imperial policing, but on constructive engagement with the object of supporting democratic regimes and market economies, the use of deterrence and limited military commitments of highly trained, specialized warrior-diplomats will be typical of 21st century-conflicts.

As Cimbala shows in his various case studies, armed forces are used most of the time for coercion, not for mass destruction. Yet much professional military thinking, expert lay opinion, and U.S. government analysis presupposes that there is a clear dividing line between all-out peace and all-out war. In addition, U.S. political culture is insensitive to the requirement for matching the political objective to the military means available, as opposed to clamoring for a psychologically satisfying form of victory. Despite these apparent obstacles, Cimbala maintains that the United States must master military persuasion because its resources for defense are limited and its commitments are ubiquitous. This book will be of particular interest to scholars, students, and professionals involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

Soon to be a major motion picture from the director of The Hangover starring Jonah Hill, the page-turning, behind-closed-doors account of how three kids from Florida became big-time weapons traders for the government and how the Pentagon later turned on them.

In January of 2007, three young stoners from Miami Beach were put in charge of a $300 million Department of Defense contract to supply ammunition to the Afghanistan military. Instead of fulfilling the order with high-quality arms, Efraim Diveroli, David Packouz, and Alex Podrizki (the dudes) bought cheap Communist-style surplus ammunition from Balkan gunrunners. The trio then secretly repackaged millions of rounds of shoddy Chinese ammunition and shipped it to Kabul—until they were caught by Pentagon investigators and the scandal turned up on the front page of The New York Times.

That’s the “official” story. The truth is far more explosive. For the first time, journalist Guy Lawson tells the thrilling true tale. It’s a trip that goes from a dive apartment in Miami Beach to mountain caves in Albania, the corridors of power in Washington, and the frontlines of Iraq and Afghanistan. Lawson’s account includes a shady Swiss gunrunner, Russian arms dealers, Albanian thugs, and a Pentagon investigation that caused ammunition shortages for the Afghanistan military. Lawson exposes the mysterious and murky world of global arms dealing, showing how the American military came to use private contractors like Diveroli, Packouz, and Podrizki as middlemen to secure weapons from illegal arms dealers—the same men who sell guns to dictators, warlords, and drug traffickers.

This is a story you were never meant to read.
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