The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring a "peace dividend" and the opportunity to redirect military policy in the United States. Instead, according to Daniel Wirls, American politics following the Cold War produced dysfunctional defense policies that were exacerbated by the war on terror. Wirls’s critical historical narrative of the politics of defense in the United States during this "decade of neglect" and the military buildup in Afghanistan and Iraq explains how and why the U.S. military has become bloated and aimless and what this means for long-term security.
Examining the recent history of U.S. military spending and policy under presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, Wirls finds that although spending decreased from the close of the first Bush presidency through the early years of Clinton’s, both administrations preferred to tinker at the edges of defense policy rather than redefine it. Years of political infighting escalated the problem, leading to a military policy stalemate as neither party managed to craft a coherent, winning vision of national security. Wirls argues that the United States has undermined its own long-term security through profligate and often counterproductive defense policies while critical national problems have gone unmitigated and unsolved.
This unified history of the politics of U.S. military policy from the end of the Cold War through the beginning of the Obama presidency provides a clear picture of why the United States is militarily powerful but "otherwise insecure."
This new textbook seeks to explain how US defense and national security policy is formulated and conducted. The focus is on the role of the President, Congress, political partisans, defense industries, lobbies, science, the media, and interest groups, including the military itself, in shaping policies. It examines the following key themes:
US grand strategy;
who joins America's military;
how and why weapons are bought;
the management of defense;
public attitudes toward the military and casualties;
the roles of the President and the Congress in controlling the military;
the effects of 9/11 on security policy, homeland security, government reorganizations, and intra- and inter-service relations.
The book shows how political and organizational interests determine US defense policy, and warns against the introduction of centralising reforms. In emphasizing the process of defense policy-making, rather than just the outcomes of that process, this book signals a departure from the style of many existing textbooks.
Cohen focuses on a two-decade period from about 1950 until 1970, during which David Ben-Gurion's vision of making Israel a nuclear-weapon state was realized. He weaves together the story of the formative years of Israel's nuclear program, from the founding of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in 1952, to the alliance with France that gave Israel the sophisticated technology it needed, to the failure of American intelligence to identify the Dimona Project for what it was, to the negotiations between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir that led to the current policy of secrecy. Cohen also analyzes the complex reasons Israel concealed its nuclear program—from concerns over Arab reaction and the negative effect of the debate at home to consideration of America's commitment to nonproliferation.
Israel and the Bomb highlights the key questions and the many potent issues surrounding Israel's nuclear history. This book will be a critical resource for students of nuclear proliferation, Middle East politics, Israeli history, and American-Israeli relations, as well as a revelation for general readers.
In response to the challenges of bringing the tenacious Israeli-Palestinian conflict to an end, many have offered grand historical perspectives, vague formulas, or visionary new proposals. Klieman goes beyond abstract reflections to offer a clear and practical assessment of which issues will be important, and why.
There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis.
No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.
Mandel's comprehensive study provides an integrated, explanatory analysis of the new global security environment, which he terms the global playground, and the consequent blossoming of ominous flows or deadly transfers. It includes an analysis of the behavior of rogue states, terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and deviant individuals. Mandel begins with a discussion of the general nature of the emerging global situation and the transborder activities that occur within it, then turns to an overarching analysis of the intractable causes, pernicious consequences, and futile cures associated with these ominous transnational flows. Such activities include clandestine conventional arms, illegal human migration, illicit drugs, hazardous materials, lethal diseases, and information disruption. Both national and international organizations are fundamentally weak when it comes to dealing with such transfers.
In contrast to the prevailing view that more deterrence-oriented coercion is necessary to stop these flows, this study suggests that a bottom-up approach involving changes in mass attitudes is crucial. It does not shy away from pointing directly at potential areas of security dysfunction at all levels of policy making. In taking a largely theoretical rather than case-specific approach to exploring these issues, it hopes to avoid the usual laundry list of shocking anecdotal incidents to develop a broader understanding of the new security dilemmas confronting us all. Finally, in demonstrating the futility of existing remedies and in suggesting an alternative, preliminary set of ideas to cope with these transactions, Mandel attempts to give security policy makers a wider arsenal of options from which to choose.
The political practice of declaring victory and coming home has provided a false and dangerous domestic impression of great success for U.S. unilateral and multilateral interventions in failing and failed states around the world. The reality of such irresponsibility is that the root causes and the violent consequences of contemporary "intranational" conflict are left to smolder and reignite at a later date with the accompanying human and physical waste. This book discusses why it is incumbent on the international community and individual powers involved in dealing with the chaos of the post-Cold War world to understand that such action requires a long-term, holistic, and strategic approach.
The intent of such an approach is to create and establish the proven internal conditions that can lead to a mandated peace and stability--with justice. The key elements that define those conditions at the strategic level include: (1) the physical establishment of order and the rule of law; (2) the isolation of belligerents; (3) the regeneration of the economy; (4) the shaping of political consent; (5) fostering peaceful conflict resolution processes; (6) achieving a complete unity of effort toward stability; and (7) establishment and maintenance of a legitimate civil society. These essential dimensions of contemporary global security and stability requirements comprise a new paradigm that will, hopefully, initiate the process of rethinking both problem and response.
Borowiec portrays Cyprus as a permanent source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and a potential trigger for future conflict between Greece and Turkey. He describes the depth of animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and analyzes the obstacles in the path of a search for a solution.
Most casual observers see the conflict between Greeks and Turks on a strategic Mediterranean island as a struggle within a sovereign state. Borowiec concludes that there has never been a Cypriot nation, only Greeks and Turks living in Cyprus, separated by the hostility reflecting the traditional animosity between their motherlands. If these two groups could forget their past conflicts--as did, for example, Germany and Poland--there might be a way to end the partition of Cyprus. At the present time, however, the crisis is likely to continue with varying degrees of tension, threatening the entire Eastern Mediterranean and undermining NATO's cohesion.
Borowiec traces the history of Cyprus from antiquity through Ottoman and British colonial rule and the post-independence period. He describes the break between the island's communities in 1963, the UN intervention of 1964, and the path toward the Athens junta's coup in 1974 which caused the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. He compares the conflicting views of the protagonists--the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Considerable attention is paid to the two separate economic and political entities on the island. Borowiec analyzes the futility of myriad international mediation efforts and suggests possible ways of creating a climate propitious to dialogue. This important new look at the Cypriot conflict will be valuable to researchers, policy makers, and scholars involved with the Eastern Mediterranean and conflict/peace studies.
Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947
Many historians of U.S. foreign relations think of the post-World War II period as a time when the United States, as an anti-colonial power, advocated collective security through the United Nations and denounced territorial aggrandizement. Yet between 1945 and 1947, the United States violated its wartime rhetoric and instead sought an imperial solution to its postwar security problems in East Asia by acquiring unilateral control of the western Pacific Islands and dominating influence throughout the entire Pacific Basin. This detailed study examines American foreign policy from the beginning of the Truman Administration to the implementation of Containment in the summer and fall of 1947. As a case study of the Truman Administration's Early Cold War efforts, it explores pre-Containment policy in light of U.S. security concerns vis-a-vis the Pearl Harbor Syndrome.
The American pursuit of a secure Pacific Basin was inconsistent at the time with its foreign policy toward other areas of the world. Thus, the consolidation of power in this region was an exception to the avowed goal of a multilateral response to the policies of the Soviet Union. This example of national or strategic security went much further than simple military control; it included the cultural assimilation of the indigenous population and the unilateral exclusion of all other powers. Analyzing traditional archival records in a new light, Friedman also investigates the persisting American notions of a Westward moving frontier that stretches beyond North American territorial bounds.