There is a wide spectrum of potential threats to the U.S. homeland that do not involve overt attacks by states using long-range missiles or conventional military forces. Such threats include covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals, and independent terrorist and extremist attacks by residents of the United States. These threats are currently limited in scope and frequency, but are emerging as potentially significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman argues that new threats require new thinking, and offers a range of recommendations, from expanding the understanding of what constitutes a threat and bolstering Homeland defense measures, to bettering resource allocation and improving intelligence gathering and analysis.
No pattern of actual attacks on U.S. territory has yet emerged that provides a clear basis for predicting how serious any given form of attack might be in the future, what means of attack might be used, or how lethal new forms of attack might be. As a result, there is a major ongoing debate over the seriousness of the threat and how the U.S. government should react. This work is an invaluable contribution to that debate.
Mandel's comprehensive study provides an integrated, explanatory analysis of the new global security environment, which he terms the global playground, and the consequent blossoming of ominous flows or deadly transfers. It includes an analysis of the behavior of rogue states, terrorist groups, transnational criminal organizations, and deviant individuals. Mandel begins with a discussion of the general nature of the emerging global situation and the transborder activities that occur within it, then turns to an overarching analysis of the intractable causes, pernicious consequences, and futile cures associated with these ominous transnational flows. Such activities include clandestine conventional arms, illegal human migration, illicit drugs, hazardous materials, lethal diseases, and information disruption. Both national and international organizations are fundamentally weak when it comes to dealing with such transfers.
In contrast to the prevailing view that more deterrence-oriented coercion is necessary to stop these flows, this study suggests that a bottom-up approach involving changes in mass attitudes is crucial. It does not shy away from pointing directly at potential areas of security dysfunction at all levels of policy making. In taking a largely theoretical rather than case-specific approach to exploring these issues, it hopes to avoid the usual laundry list of shocking anecdotal incidents to develop a broader understanding of the new security dilemmas confronting us all. Finally, in demonstrating the futility of existing remedies and in suggesting an alternative, preliminary set of ideas to cope with these transactions, Mandel attempts to give security policy makers a wider arsenal of options from which to choose.
The political practice of declaring victory and coming home has provided a false and dangerous domestic impression of great success for U.S. unilateral and multilateral interventions in failing and failed states around the world. The reality of such irresponsibility is that the root causes and the violent consequences of contemporary "intranational" conflict are left to smolder and reignite at a later date with the accompanying human and physical waste. This book discusses why it is incumbent on the international community and individual powers involved in dealing with the chaos of the post-Cold War world to understand that such action requires a long-term, holistic, and strategic approach.
The intent of such an approach is to create and establish the proven internal conditions that can lead to a mandated peace and stability--with justice. The key elements that define those conditions at the strategic level include: (1) the physical establishment of order and the rule of law; (2) the isolation of belligerents; (3) the regeneration of the economy; (4) the shaping of political consent; (5) fostering peaceful conflict resolution processes; (6) achieving a complete unity of effort toward stability; and (7) establishment and maintenance of a legitimate civil society. These essential dimensions of contemporary global security and stability requirements comprise a new paradigm that will, hopefully, initiate the process of rethinking both problem and response.
Borowiec portrays Cyprus as a permanent source of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean and a potential trigger for future conflict between Greece and Turkey. He describes the depth of animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and analyzes the obstacles in the path of a search for a solution.
Most casual observers see the conflict between Greeks and Turks on a strategic Mediterranean island as a struggle within a sovereign state. Borowiec concludes that there has never been a Cypriot nation, only Greeks and Turks living in Cyprus, separated by the hostility reflecting the traditional animosity between their motherlands. If these two groups could forget their past conflicts--as did, for example, Germany and Poland--there might be a way to end the partition of Cyprus. At the present time, however, the crisis is likely to continue with varying degrees of tension, threatening the entire Eastern Mediterranean and undermining NATO's cohesion.
Borowiec traces the history of Cyprus from antiquity through Ottoman and British colonial rule and the post-independence period. He describes the break between the island's communities in 1963, the UN intervention of 1964, and the path toward the Athens junta's coup in 1974 which caused the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. He compares the conflicting views of the protagonists--the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Considerable attention is paid to the two separate economic and political entities on the island. Borowiec analyzes the futility of myriad international mediation efforts and suggests possible ways of creating a climate propitious to dialogue. This important new look at the Cypriot conflict will be valuable to researchers, policy makers, and scholars involved with the Eastern Mediterranean and conflict/peace studies.
Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947
Many historians of U.S. foreign relations think of the post-World War II period as a time when the United States, as an anti-colonial power, advocated collective security through the United Nations and denounced territorial aggrandizement. Yet between 1945 and 1947, the United States violated its wartime rhetoric and instead sought an imperial solution to its postwar security problems in East Asia by acquiring unilateral control of the western Pacific Islands and dominating influence throughout the entire Pacific Basin. This detailed study examines American foreign policy from the beginning of the Truman Administration to the implementation of Containment in the summer and fall of 1947. As a case study of the Truman Administration's Early Cold War efforts, it explores pre-Containment policy in light of U.S. security concerns vis-a-vis the Pearl Harbor Syndrome.
The American pursuit of a secure Pacific Basin was inconsistent at the time with its foreign policy toward other areas of the world. Thus, the consolidation of power in this region was an exception to the avowed goal of a multilateral response to the policies of the Soviet Union. This example of national or strategic security went much further than simple military control; it included the cultural assimilation of the indigenous population and the unilateral exclusion of all other powers. Analyzing traditional archival records in a new light, Friedman also investigates the persisting American notions of a Westward moving frontier that stretches beyond North American territorial bounds.
Providing a timely account of European security developments, this edited collection delves into the theoretical and political debates central to European security cooperation. The essays analyze the interaction between states and institutions as they shape European security cooperation in the wake of the Cold War.
After outlining the goals and context of the project, the book turns to case studies of the roles and policies of the U.S., Russia, Germany, and France. European security, institutions, and arms control regimes, such as the European Union, the Western European Union, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are examined. Conventional forces in Europe, and confidence and security building measures are also explored. Throughout, the contributors focus on the possibilities and limits of security cooperation as Europe prepares for the next century. Students and scholars concerned with international security issues, international relations theory, and European security and politics will be particularly interested.
NATO's military interventions in the Balkans have transformed the alliance. As the alliance goes East, its members are compelled to rethink NATO's, and each member nation's, military and political roles. Providing a well-rounded study of continuing change in the contemporary North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this book is constructed around eight essays by European security experts analyzing challenges confronting the Atlantic Alliance as a military alliance and as a collective security organization dealing simultaneously with deterrence, enlargement, and regional crisis intervention. It is intended for senior undergraduate and graduate students in international relations, American foreign policy, European studies, security and strategic studies.
The evidence is that NATO will undergo many more changes responding to actual and potential threats to Europe's peace. These range from a revival of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia to the proliferation and possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Also discussed is the matter of NATO's further enlargement and the question of whether this offers more or less security to the alliance membership, as are the emerging tensions between the EU and NATO security regimes.
Twenty-six key officials and experts analyze the NATO decision to expand into Central-Eastern Europe. Contributors include the NATO Secretary General Solana, President Clinton, former Soviet leader Gorbachev, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Joulwan, several active and former foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, other high officials, and prominent academics from the United States and Europe. Particular attention is paid to the rationale, pros and cons, and the impact on Russia, Ukraine, the European neutrals, the new NATO members, and the remaining hopefuls.
The volume begins by presenting the offical NATO explanation of the 1997 decision to expand into Central-Eastern Europe and examines the problems the decisions might well create. Next are essays providing a critique of the decision, mainly from the standpoint of the West's future relations with Russia. Polish, Czech, and Hungarian officals then describe their countries' positions and expectations as new NATO members, after which the credentials of six candidates for the next round of NATO enlargement are analyzed. After discussing the impact of NATO enlargement on the European neutrals and the Nordic states, the volume concludes with a presentation of major arguments for and against the enlargement and the known or presumed motivations of the main actors related to NATO enlargement.
During World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower became convinced that the era of separate land, sea, and air operations was over and that future military operations would involve all three elements acting in concert. He foresaw that, once peace had been restored, the waste and duplication of effort which characterized America's military operations during the war would not be tolerated by an economy-minded Congress. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw national security as dependent upon maintaining a healthy economy and a strong military. His goal, therefore, was the achievement of an efficient, properly balanced military establishment within the context of a healthy economy through the unification of the services into a single Cabinet level department.
As Army Chief of Staff, adviser to Secretaries of National Defense James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, and then as president, Eisenhower was a leader in the effort to achieve unification. The final result of these efforts, the Military Reorganization Act of 1958, did not encompass all of the changes that Eisenhower originally sought. However, he had been instrumental in transforming the unorganized military establishment of pre-war America into a highly centralized organization led by a powerful secretary of defense. This structure would remain unchanged for twenty-eight years.
After briefly dealing with arguments for and against NATO's enlargement as far as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the author shows why the enlargement process must be carried forward to include, in the near future, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Ukraine. Inclusion of the Baltic States and of Ukraine in NATO would stabilize the region by helping the Russian democrats to concentrate on building a genuinely democratic, market-oriented Russian national state, instead of succumbing to the temptation to restore the Soviet Union. Ukraine could also contribute to NATO a sizable conventional military force and a prime strategic area; the Baltic States offer a prime location and an indomitable spirit. The Balts and Ukraine will help NATO when finally admitted as full members.
Using polling data, printed material, and interviews with Lithuanian and Ukrainian diplomats, the book convincingly shows the soundness of the Baltic and Ukrainian security goals without glossing over some difficulties, both internal and external.