Part I: Grand Strategy (U.S. goals; China's grand strategy; Japan's grand strategy; Russian strategy; ASEAN national security); Part II: Economic Dimensions (challenge of geoeconomics; interdependence on Northeast Asia); Part III: Regional Military Strategy (Japanese self-defense forces; Korean military forces; Russia's new military doctrine; China's strategic concepts); Part IV: Regional Strategic Structures in the 21st Century (post-cold war security structures and strategic architecture for the Pacific).
This book explores the ways that institutions play a role - or fail to - in Japanese and American approaches to regional governance in East Asia. It uses recent studies on the logic and dynamics of institutions to determine the logic of order within the East Asia region. The central focus is on bilateral and multilateral regional institutions.
Japanese leaders and often the media too have substituted symbols for strategy in dealing with Asia. This comprehensive review of four periods over twenty years exposes the strategic gap in viewing individually and collectively China, Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, Russia, Central Asia, and regionalism.
An international team of ten specialists in Japanese and American foreign relations address the crucial question: what role should Japan play in international affairs? This question has not found a fully satisfactory answer since the forced opening to foreign contacts in the mid-nineteenth century. Having copied foreign models and achieved a series of stunning successes -- and some failures -- in many aspects of private and public life, Japan today stands at a pinnacle of economic power and affluence. Despite this, both economics and politics are undergoing major strains and changes during the 1990s, and the quest for true internationalization is fraught with problems and only partially fulfilled. This book is a joint project of the American University in Washington and Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto.
This volume is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the strategic reconfiguration of Central Asia as Russia has become more disengaged from the nations in the region and as these nations have developed new relations to the south, east, and west. The international implications are enormous because of the rich energy sources—oil and natural gas—located in the Caspian Sea area. The authors assess a variety of internal security policy challenges confronting these states—for example, the potential for conflict arising from such factors as a mixed ethnic population, resource scarcity, particularly in relation to water management, and an Islamic revival. They also examine the security policy content of relations between the Central Asian states and regional and international powers—specifically the stakes, interests, and policies of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States. These internal challenges and the evolution of relations with external powers may result in new cooperative relationships, but they may also lead to destabilizing rivalry and interstate enmity in Central Asia. It is important to identify new patterns of relevance for future security cooperation in the region, but the potential for a new security system or for new institutions to manage security in the region remains uncertain. These issues are explored by a team of prominent specialists from Western Europe, the United States, Russia and China.
In July 1997, the promise of the ¡°Asian economic miracle¡± and the ¡°Pacific century¡± devolved into economic chaos and the onset of what has become known as the Asian financial crisis. One by one, many of the region¡¯s great economic success stories suffered damage to their financial markets, their currencies, and economic well-being.This volume, the result of an April 1999 conference organized by the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research and the Brookings Institution, examines the sources and lessons of the Asian financial crisis. Experts from both sides of the Pacific have drawn valuable policy lessons from the failures and successes of four key economies in the region: Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. In examining Taiwan¡¯s relative success in weathering the storm, this volume helps explain the widely varying degrees of performance of the region¡¯s affected economies. The concluding chapter focuses on general principles for the liberalization of financial markets and stabilization of macroeconomy in developing countries.This work provides much-needed new understanding and reasoned policy lessons to help the Asia-Pacific region meet its vast economic potential. It will be useful for academics and economic policymakers in governments, international organizations, universities, and research institutions, both in the region and beyond, as they assess and implement strategies for more stable regional and global economic development.
Using extensive documentation, this book examines how President Jimmy Carter's troop withdrawal and human rights policies—conceived in abstraction from East Asian realities—contributed to the demise of Korean President Park Chung Hee. The author suggests that some lessons are relevant beyond Korea, for example, in our treatment of human rights problems in China today.
Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.
The relationship between Taiwan and China is a paradox. On the one hand, the two economies are becoming increasingly integrated, as Taiwanese companies have come to regard the mainland as the best place to manufacture their products and maintain global competitiveness. On the other hand, the long-running and changing political dispute between the two governments remains unresolved. Each side fears the intentions of the other and is acquiring military capabilities to deter disaster. In its pursuit of peace in the Taiwan Strait, the United States could get drawn into a war between the two rivals. Richard C. Bush, whose career has been dedicated to Taiwan-China issues, explores the conflicts between these nations and the difficulties that must be resolved. Disagreements over sovereignty and security form the core of the dispute. What would be the legal status and international role of the Taiwan government in a future unified China? Given China's growing military power, how could Taiwan feel secure? Complicating these issues are domestic politics and international competition, as well as misperceptions on both sides. Thus multiple obstacles prevent the two sides from even getting to the negotiating table, much less reaching a mutually acceptable resolution. For reasons of policy and politics, the United States is constrained from a central role. To begin with, it must provide China with some reassurance about its policy in order to secure cooperation on foreign policy issues. At the same time, it must bolster Taiwan's political confidence and military deterrence while discouraging provocative actions. The arcane nature of this dispute severely restricts the role of the United States as conflict mediator. But if there is to be any solution to this conflict, the comprehensive analysis that this book provides will be required reading for effective policy.
The post–World War II paradigm that ensured security and prosperity for the Japanese people has lost much of its effectiveness. The current generation has become increasingly resentful of the prolonged economic stagnation and feels a sense of drift and uncertainty about the future of Japan's foreign policy. In J apanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, Yutaka Kawashima clarifies some of the defining parameters of Japan's past foreign policy and examines the challenges it currently faces, including the quagmire on the Korean Peninsula, the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the management of Japan-China relations, and Japan's relation with Southeast Asia. Kawashima—who, as vice minister of foreign affairs, was Japan's highest-ranking foreign service official—cautions Japan against attempts to ensure its own security and well-being outside of an international framework. He believes it is crucial that Japan work with as many like-minded countries as possible to construct a regional and international order based on shared interests and shared values. In an era of globalization, he cautions, such efforts will be crucial to maintaining global world order and ensuring civilized interaction among all states.