A popular lecturer of economics at Cambridge University and editor of the Economic Journal, Keynes made The Economic Consequences of the Peace a major step in his career. It was translated into a dozen languages and sold 100,000 copies in six months. Taken seriously even by those who were opposed to his claims, the book helped lift economics to a new, higher level of recognition and acceptance. This volume, with its insightful portraits of Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson, remains one of the great works of political economy of our time.
In a penetrating introduction written for this new edition, David Felix explores Keynes' reasons for writing the book, analyzes the author's arguments, and paints an historical backdrop of the period during which it was written.
"The most important economic document relating to World War I and its aftermath."--John Kenneth Galbraith
"This is a very great book. Mr. Keynes writes with a fullness of knowledge, an incisiveness of judgment, and a penetration into the ultimate causes of economic events. The style is like finely hammered steel. It is full of unforgettable phrases and of vivid portraits etched in the biting acid of a passionate moral indignation."--H. J. Laski, The Nation
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) was one of the greatest economic theorists of the twentieth century. He was chairman of the liberal journal of opinion The Nation and economics advisor for more than thirty years to British governments. He wrote several books, including his masterpiece, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, the two-volume Treatise on Money, and A Tract on Monetary Reform.
David Felix is professor of history emeritus at the City University of New York. His books include Biography of an Idea: John Maynard Keynes and The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and Keynes: A Critical Life.
The Triple Entente went hand in hand with two policies of Stolypin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers: draconian repression of the revolutionaries and sweeping domestic reforms. Acutely aware that serious failures in foreign policy would threaten the regime's existence, the imperial government designed both its foreign and its domestic policies to consolidate the autocracy for the twentieth century. Nicholas II gambled on the Triple Entente and its diplomatic alignment with the other two status-quo powers as the best means of preserving the peace in Europe and thereby preserving the imperial system as well.
Challenging the view that the 20th century will be viewed by future historians as ranging from approximately 1914 to 1992, Willmott offers this volume as a counter to modern historiography which, he contends, is obsessed with micro-analysis and has lost vital context and perspective. Arguing that war is not the preserve of the intellect, and that it is neither intrinsically rational nor scientific, Willmott depicts war as a manmade phenomenon, complete with all the elements of human failure, misjudgment, and incompetence. He concludes with a consideration of modern doctrine and predictions for the future of war.
During initial stages of the conflict, the French were the enemy at sea. Later, Italy switched allegiances, joining the Entente against her former allies. Because the KuK Kriegsmarine was no match for the Italians and the French combined, the battle fleet was thereafter kept in being at Pola, holding the Allies in check. Nonetheless, the Adriatic became an Austrian lake. Using aircraft, U-boats, torpedoes, and mines, the KuK worked toward reducing the odds against it. However, the impasse would continue until the armistice, ruling out a Mahanian showdown in the Adriatic. Koburger provides important geostrategic points of comparison and valuable lessons for other conflicts, even today.