What they find is that settlements are more likely to produce an enduring peace if they involve construction of a diversity of power-sharing and power-dividing arrangements between former adversaries. The strongest negotiated settlements prove to be those in which former rivals agree to share or divide state power across its economic, military, political, and territorial dimensions.
This finding is a significant addition to the existing literature, which tends to focus more on the role that third parties play in mediating and enforcing agreements. Beyond the quantitative analyses, the authors include a chapter comparing contrasting cases of successful and unsuccessful settlements in the Philippines and Angola, respectively.
The peacekeeping system has largely outlived its usefulness and is bound to fail when applied to currently predominant violent and messy conflagrations. Lacking radical changes in that system, the UN should disarm, restricting the peacekeeping to military observers' missions and to subcontracting other operations out to military alliances and regional organizations. The widely lamented massacres of innocent civilians under UN Peacekeeper eyes in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and the Congo influenced neither the UN's approach nor the analysis of the methods. In this book, Andrzej Sitkowski confronts two basic peacekeeping myths. First, the belief that peacekeeping is distinct from peace enforcement blurs this distinction and undermines the viability of peacekeeping operations. In fact, it is the UN's definition of self-defense, which is understood to include actions of troops against forceful obstructions to discharging their mandates, that confuses the issue. Nevertheless, that distinction remains a cornerstone of the UN doctrine. Secondly, it is widely believed that the peacekeepers are allowed to apply force only in self-defense and lack the authorization to use it in defending UN Security Councils mandates. This myth persists, even in cases when the UN Security Council undertakes explicit authorization to enforce specific goals of the mandate.
Sitkowski offers a critical re-appraisal of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, including both the largest successes (Namibia) and worst disasters (Rwanda). Drawing heavily on personal accounts, the book is solidly anchored in official primary sources originating from the UN, national governments, parliamentary inquiries (Dutch, French and Belgian) and from the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda. It integrates the most recent recommendations related to peacekeeping originating from High-Level Panels and endorsed by Kofi Annan. Finally it exposes how the UN peacekeeping syndrome of soldiers safety first crept into the NATO's strategy and compromises its missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.
Focusing on contrasting case studies of the Congo, Cyprus, Somalia and Angola, as well as more recent operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor, it probes new evidence with clarity and rigour.
The authors conclude that most peacekeeping operations - whether in the Cold War or Post-Cold War periods - were flawed due to the failure of the UN member states to agree upon achievable objectives, the precise nature of the operations and provision of the necessary resources, and unrealistic post-1989 expectations that UN peacekeeping operations could be adapted to the changed international circumstances. The study concludes by looking at the Brahimi reforms, questions whether these are realistically achievable and looks at their impact on contemporary peace operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor and elsewhere.
In the twenty-first century, intervention can take many forms: military and economic, unilateral and multilateral. Doyle’s thought-provoking argument examines essential moral and legal questions underlying significant American foreign policy dilemmas of recent years, including Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
In Striking First, Doyle shows how the Bush Doctrine has consistently disregarded a vital distinction in international law between acts of preemption in the face of imminent threats and those of prevention in the face of the growing offensive capability of an enemy. Taking a close look at the Iraq war, the 1998 attack against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, among other conflicts, he contends that international law must rely more completely on United Nations Charter procedures and develop clearer standards for dealing with lethal but not immediate threats.
After explaining how the UN can again play an important role in enforcing international law and strengthening international guidelines for responding to threats, he describes the rare circumstances when unilateral action is indeed necessary. Based on the 2006 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, Striking First includes responses by distinguished political theorists Richard Tuck and Jeffrey McMahan and international law scholar Harold Koh, yielding a lively debate that will redefine how--and for what reasons--tomorrow's wars are fought.