The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets: Second Edition, Edition 2

Princeton University Press
2
Free sample

Most labor economics textbooks pay little attention to actual labor markets, taking as reference a perfectly competitive market in which losing a job is not a big deal. The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets is the only textbook to focus on imperfect labor markets and to provide a systematic framework for analyzing how labor market institutions operate. This expanded, updated, and thoroughly revised second edition includes a new chapter on labor-market discrimination; quantitative examples; data and programming files enabling users to replicate key results of the literature; exercises at the end of each chapter; and expanded technical appendixes.

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets examines the many institutions that affect the behavior of workers and employers in imperfect labor markets. These include minimum wages, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, working-time regulations, family policies, equal opportunity legislation, collective bargaining, early retirement programs, education and migration policies, payroll taxes, and employment-conditional incentives. Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are today being changed by political and economic forces.

  • Expanded, thoroughly revised second edition
  • New chapter on labor-market discrimination
  • New quantitative examples
  • New data sets enabling users to replicate key results of the literature
  • New end-of-chapter exercises (with solutions at www.press.princeton.edu)
  • Expanded technical appendixes
  • Unique focus on institutions in imperfect labor markets
  • Integrated framework and systematic coverage
  • Self-contained chapters on each of the most important labor-market institutions
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About the author

Tito Boeri is professor of labor economics at Bocconi University in Milan and scientific director of the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti. Jan van Ours is professor of labor economics at Tilburg University in the Netherlands and professorial fellow in economics at the University of Melbourne.
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Additional Information

Publisher
Princeton University Press
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Published on
Sep 8, 2013
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Pages
464
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ISBN
9781400848195
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Best For
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Language
English
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Genres
Business & Economics / Economics / General
Business & Economics / Labor
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Content Protection
This content is DRM protected.
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Eligible for Family Library

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The ruling class plays a major role in society. It makes possible what would otherwise be infeasible, by removing constraints that may stand in the way of long-term growth. Historically, economists devoted far less attention than sociologists to the study of ruling classes. Using the theoretical tools of economists, this volume provides an understanding of what drives the formation of a ruling class, and the relationship between politics and business firms. Focusing on Italy, it uses labour economics to analyse the selection of the ruling class, the labour market of politicians, the allocation of managers' time, and their incentives, remunerations, and career paths. It draws on contributions from two teams of leading scholars and on research undertaken by the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti. Part I focuses on the labour market of politicians. It uses detailed information on personal characteristics, incomes, performance in office, and career paths (both before and after the Parliamentary mandate) of all the politicians elected to the Italian Lower Chamber (Camera) between 1948 and 2008. This is the first time that this information has been gathered and summarized in key indicators. Part II is devoted to the managerial class. It includes cross-country surveys of managers across a sample of European countries, surveys carried out in cooperation with the largest union of managers in the service sector, social security records, and, for the first time, surveys on the allocation of time for top executives.
From the author of Aftershock and The Work of Nations, his most important book to date—a myth-shattering breakdown of how the economic system that helped make America so strong is now failing us, and what it will take to fix it.

Perhaps no one is better acquainted with the intersection of economics and politics than Robert B. Reich, and now he reveals how power and influence have created a new American oligarchy, a shrinking middle class, and the greatest income inequality and wealth disparity in eighty years. He makes clear how centrally problematic our veneration of the “free market” is, and how it has masked the power of moneyed interests to tilt the market to their benefit.

Reich exposes the falsehoods that have been bolstered by the corruption of our democracy by huge corporations and the revolving door between Washington and Wall Street: that all workers are paid what they’re “worth,” that a higher minimum wage equals fewer jobs, and that corporations must serve shareholders before employees. He shows that the critical choices ahead are not about the size of government but about who government is for: that we must choose not between a free market and “big” government but between a market organized for broadly based prosperity and one designed to deliver the most gains to the top. Ever the pragmatist, ever the optimist, Reich sees hope for reversing our slide toward inequality and diminished opportunity when we shore up the countervailing power of everyone else.

Passionate yet practical, sweeping yet exactingly argued, Saving Capitalism is a revelatory indictment of our economic status quo and an empowering call to civic action.


From the Hardcover edition.
In this book, first-rate international scholars in the field explore the role that unions are likely to play in the changed economic environment of the new century. Questions discussed include: What will unions look like in the years to come? Which kind of interest groups will they represent? How important will be the broader political role of unions? To what extent do unions care about future generations? Part One documents a tendency towards greater decentralization in collective bargaining and declining union membership rates in most European countries. The process of decentralization may only be partly reversed by social pacts of the type that occurred in several EU countries in the run-up to EMU. Yet this type of co-ordination is likely to be increasingly unstable in a context where membership is falling, hence will inevitably require government intervention. Not all governments may wish to intervene in wage setting, however, as there are strong reasons to believe that such intervention could impose wage rigidities in some parts of the economy and lead to non-enforcement in other parts. Moreover, under EMU what matters is ultimately co-ordination of bargaining at the pan-European level rather than simply at the national level. Such higher-level, transnational co-ordination is not likely to occur for a long time to come because of the huge costs that it involves. Some transnational co-ordination may occur within multinational firms, however, as costs are likely to be much lower at this level. Part Two characterizes the intergenerational conflicts present within unions. Unions may be able to better respond to the needs of the unemployed without losing the support of current employees when they become involved in the running of unemployment benefit systems, as has been the case in those countries applying the so-called Ghent system. They may also succeed in making the system more efficient by, for example, contributing to the reduction of moral hazard problems associated with the provision of unemployment insurance. Unions are, however, unlikely to solve the latent conflict between their younger and older members in a context where the population is ageing, since they tend to preserve the status quo when it comes to cutting pension benefits in order to deal with demographic transition. The cost of these dynamic inefficiencies may be accepted by younger generations as long as an intergenerational contract can be enforced whereby unions guarantee that the status quo will be preserved, and are credible in their commitment. Unions could play a key role in this implicit intergenerational pact because they are long-lived agents—-certainly longer-lived than many governments—-but, under present conditions, this pact may be no longer credible.
The recent financial crisis has created a public outcry over top-executive pay packages and has led to calls for reform of executive pay in Europe and the US. The current controversy is not the first - nor will it be the last - time that executive compensation has sparked outrage and led to regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. This volume compares US and European CEOs to trace the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies and its resulting regulations. It shows that many features of current executive compensation practices reflect the, often-unintended, consequences of regulatory responses to perceived abuses in top-executive pay, which frequently stem from relatively isolated events or situations. Regulation creates unintended (and usually costly) side effects and it is often driven by political agendas rather than shareholder value. Improvements in executive compensation are more likely to come from stronger corporate governance, and not through direct government intervention. The volume also examines the effects of incentive schemes and the patterns of performance related pay both within and across countries. It documents a number of empirical regularities and discusses whether government should intervene to support the implementation of incentive pay schemes. It argues that it makes little sense to undertake reform without detailed simulations of the effect on the economy under alternative economic scenarios, based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers.
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