This study examines the potential for a “federated defense” approach to U.S. action in the Middle East, the constraints to closer military cooperation in the region, and specific capability areas that would benefit from federated defense. Stabilizing the Middle East requires continued attention and investment from the United States and its global allies and partners. Federated defense involves building partner capabilities in a way that shares the burden of providing security in a more effective and efficient manner. Federated defense would, over time, create partner capabilities that augment and complement U.S. capabilities. Doing so requires identifying discrete areas of cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners that would leverage partner capabilities in pursuing common security objectives.
Investments in amphibious capabilities by U.S. partners and allies in the Asia Pacific is altering the range of capabilities available in that region. It is also changing the types and frequency of exercises partner nations seek to undertake with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team. This study examines ally- and partner-nation investments in amphibious capabilities, how those capabilities will impact demand for U.S. forces, and the range of U.S. amphibious fleet composites to meet the changing demand.
This report offers a reexamination of U.S. Army posture in Europe amid heightened tensions between the United States and Russia over the geopolitical orientation of Ukraine. This study reviews Russian military capabilities; considers alternative U.S. force posture arrangements; assesses how to determine whether assurance and deterrence goals are being met; and offers concrete recommendations in order to optimize the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe to deter Russian aggression against the most vulnerable NATO members.
This report is the final installment in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N) project assessment of defense reform. The report takes a strategic view of defense governance, focusing on the future efforts of the next U.S. secretary of defense and the secretary's senior-most aides to fulfill priority objectives. With so many prior reform efforts on which to build, the BG-N study team sought to identify the key problems inhibiting effective performance in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the barriers to reform that prevented earlier proposals from taking root. It concluded that many proposed changes have faltered because they failed to account for and find ways to alter the likely behavior of individuals and organizations. As Goldwater-Nichols taught, the ability to affect incentive structures is the most indispensable ingredient of any successful reform. Attempts to simply rework organizational wiring diagrams or create new and seemingly more nimble processes will fail unless they are buttressed by changes in the underlying incentives that motivate individual and organizational actions.Accordingly, this report examines and makes recommendation on: major challenges to defense governance; a defense governance framework; improving strategic direction; furthering capabilities-based approaches; creating accountability; integrating strategy, execution, and assessment; advocating for the future joint force; and improving force development.
This report offers an examination of U.S. Army force posture in Europe amid heightened tensions between the United States and Russia. The report explores the necessary components of a sustainable and credible deterrence posture in Europe and highlights key challenges—from the strategic down to the tactical level. It offers recommendations for how to best recalibrate U.S. defense and deterrence posture in Europe over the next decade.
This report is the first regional study in the CSIS Federated Defense series. The Federated Defense Project aims to shift the paradigm with key allies and partners from capacity building to a federated approach that would expand regional security and prosperity by joining regional allies and partners together in the pursuit of shared security objectives across the conflict spectrum. Federated defense should include forward-thinking strategies for how to develop and share capabilities and capacity, thereby more deeply integrating the US military with its allies and partners. In this report, the CSIS project team highlights six potential federated initiatives in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information and intelligence sharing, maritime security, undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber security. Federated approaches such as these are vital to developing and integrating Asian security capabilities to manage emerging security challenges.
America is not ready for the next catastrophe. Almost seven years have passed since the nation was attacked here at home by violent Islamist extremists who remain free and who have made clear their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, should they be able to acquire or build them. Almost three years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and laid bare myriad flaws in the nation's preparedness and response system. Simply creating the Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Northern Command was not enough to make the country prepared. There are still no detailed, government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. There are still almost no dedicated military forces on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home. There are still no guidelines to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst.Many of the building blocks required to move the country toward being truly prepared to handle a catastrophe already exist in some form, but the next administration needs to bring the pieces together, fill in the gaps, and provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If implemented, the recommendations contained in this report--part of the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project--would go a long way toward getting America ready to manage the next domestic catastrophe, whatever form it might take.
The CSIS U.S. Defense and National Security Group and Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group examined eight years of defense reforms during the administration of George W. Bush and identified for the incoming administration (1) successful reforms to maintain, (2) partially successful reforms to improve, (3) and failed experiments to halt.Presidential transitions often bring the promise of new opportunities and the threat of reversing key advances. With this in mind, the CSIS U.S. Defense and National Security Group and the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group conducted a study aimed at informing the next Secretary of Defense's transition decisions. The CSIS study team focused on the little understood organizational and process changes that the Bush administration has implemented in an attempt to improve the Defense Department's internal operations in the categories of strategic direction, force development, force employment, force management, and corporate support. The study team found that the attempted Bush administration defense reforms ran the gamut from qualified success to qualified failure.Top 10 recommendations for the next Secretary of Defense: ? Acquisitions: Institutionalize recent guidance, restore a defense acquisition workforce, and provide cost realism in setting program requirements.? Strategic Guidance: Establish three to five discrete and manageable priorities and task the D(PA&E) or other official to report quarterly on efforts to achieve these priorities.? Program and Budget: Require the D(PA&E) or other official to assume all capability portfolio assessment responsibilities from the current capability portfolio managers and reinstitute separate annual Program (Capability) and Budget Reviews.? OUSD(P) Reorganization: Ensure at least ASD-level emphasis on nuclear, space, and cyber matters. Create Director for Strategy, Execution, and Assessment or realign Policy Planning and FT&R organizations under a single manager.? Joint Requirements: Add functional combatant commanders as voting members of the JROC. Add the commander, USJFCOM to the JROC as the Department's Future Joint Force Advocate.? UCP Revisions: Direct OSD and the Joint Staff to undertake a zero-based assessment of the unified command plan and revisit the roles and responsibilities of USNORTHCOM, USJFCOM, and USSTRATCOM.? Joint Concepts: Direct CJCS to place a hold on all joint concept development except Joint Integrating Concepts and to create a Senior Advisory Panel to provide recommendations regarding the concept development process.? OUSD(I): With the DNI, clarify USD(I) authorities and responsibilities in the Intelligence Community. Direct the CIO to serve as an approval authority on all relevant PPBS and acquisition issues.? Adaptive Planning and Execution System: Require the Director, DISA to provide in-person monthly reports on progress in deploying a full suit of enabling software for adaptive planning.? Future Security Environment: Direct selected defense officials to meet as a Futures Group to cultivate a shared understanding of DoD's long-range fiscal, technological, geopolitical, and military operational projections.The report incorporates a wide range of personal interviews with key Bush administration defense officials, career civilian and military subject matter experts, defense contractors, and leading outside defense thinkers, including senior leaders from previous administrations.
This is the inaugural report in the CSIS Defense Outlook Series, an annual review of what happened in the U.S. Department of Defense in the past year and what CSIS experts are looking for in the next. It is meant to serve as a roadmap to track where the course of policy and actions relating to strategy, budget, forces, and acquisition has run and what curves lie ahead.