Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science

There is no doubt that Commons's ideas proposed in Institutional Economics such as transactions and collective actions greatly inspired later economists; however, few studies have contributed to comprehensive understanding of the origin of his masterpiece. To what extent and in what sense had Commons rejected or accepted previous classical economics or marginalism for constituting his original institutional economics? What are the meanings and limitations that reasonable value may have for contemporary political economy?

Institutional Economics as attempts to resolve deep economic problems at that time. Commons's efforts create important implications for us, those who are living in an era after the global financial crisis and confronting various challenges to political economy.

Orthodox environmental economics usually understands environmental issues under the rules of market economy, while environmental sciences subordinate economy to physical constraints of the environment. Instead of these hierarchical visions, this book recognizes economy and the environment as co-evolving systems.

The theoretical framework is elaborated based on the régulation and post-Keynesian theories combined. An idea of three-dimensional factors—capital, labor, and the environment—leads to conceptual and mathematical models, which will be applicable to wider analyses.

Using this framework, Japanese history is analyzed as a typical example of environmental policy development. Historical transformations of environmental policies and growth regimes are explained using indices and econometric analysis. Experiences of strict regulations with positive economic impacts are also identified.

These works lead to some interesting implications, which include mechanisms, the possibility, and conditions of "green growth''. This book proposes a new approach by bridging the gap between evolutionary–institutional economics and environmental economics, which should be stimulating to them both and possibly open the door for a new research avenue.

This book thus provides the indispensable philosophical-scientific foundations for this new approach, and then moves on to empirical–epistemological studies concerning changes in sentiments and other movements in financial markets.

Our point of departure is the addition of myopic agents with severely limited rational and forecasting capacities (in stark contrast to mainstream economics). We show how myopic agents, in a complex world, can produce a stable price system and demonstrate how they can adjust their production to changing demand flows. Agents behave without any knowledge of the overall process, and they generate a stable economy as large as the global network of exchanges. This is the true “miracle” of the market mechanism. In contrast to mainstream general equilibrium theory, this miracle can be explained without the need for an auctioneer or infinitely rational agents. Thanks to this book, evolutionary economics can now claim to be an independent approach to economics that can completely replace mainstream neoclassical economics.

First, readers are introduced to the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory. The two-player, two-strategy game, or the 2 × 2 game, is presented as an archetype to help understand the difficulty of cooperating for survival against defection in common social contexts. Subsequently, the book explains the theoretical background of the multi-player, two-strategy game, which may be more widely applicable than the 2 × 2 game for social dilemmas. The latest applications of 2 × 2 games are also discussed to explore how integrated reciprocity mechanisms can solve social dilemmas.

In turn, the book describes two practical areas in which evolutionary game theory has been applied. The first concerns traffic flow analysis. In conventional interpretations, traffic flow can be understood by means of fluid dynamics, in which the flow of vehicles is evaluated as a continuum body. Such a simple idea, however, does not work well in reality, particularly if a driver’s decision-making process is considered. Various dilemmas involve complex structures that depend primarily on traffic density, a revelation that should help establish a practical solution for reducing traffic congestion.

Second, the book provides keen insights into how powerful evolutionary game theory can be in the context of epidemiology. Both approaches, quasi-analytical and multi-agent simulation, can clarify how an infectious disease such as seasonal influenza spreads across a complex social network, which is significantly affected by the public attitude toward vaccination. A methodology is proposed for the optimum design of a public vaccination policy incorporating subsidies to efficiently increase vaccination coverage while minimizing the social cost.

This book presents examples of and the latest simulation studies on artificial societies and populations, highlighting innovative implementations of various models of artificial societies and populations using a new, C++-related simulation tool. It demonstrates that the prey-predator models—including spatial distribution, moving patterns, limited renewable food, fear, gregarious (herd) instinct, clustering, epidemics, and competition—are more complex than other publications have suggested, and highlights the great discrepancy between agent-based and conventional continuous models. The book also discusses the modeling and simulation of self-organization and interactions between organizations, including terror organizations, offering fascinating insights into organizational dynamics.

The book provides a broad range of examples and comparisons with the classical dynamics approach, showing readers how to construct models of complex systems. It starts with descriptions of the behavior of interacting individuals and also includes important information on the macro-behavior of the whole system.

The late Professor Masanao Aoki of UCLA, who passed away at the end of July 2018, in his later years dedicated himself to the reconstruction of macroeconomics mainly in terms of statistical physics. Professor Aoki, who was already an IEEE fellow, was also named an Econometric Society Fellow in 1979. Until the early 1990s, however, his contributions were focused on the new developments of a novel algorithm for the time series model and their applications to economic data. Those contributions were undoubtedly equivalent to the Nobel Prize-winning work of Granger's "co-integration method". After the publications of his New Approaches to Macroeconomic Modeling and Modeling Aggregate Behavior and Fluctuations in Economics, both published by Cambridge University Press, in 1996 and 2002, respectively, his contributions rapidly became known and spread throughout the field. In short, these new works challenged econophysicists to develop evolutionary stochastic dynamics, multiple equilibria, and externalities as field effects and revolutionized the stochastic views of interacting agents. In particular, the publication of Reconstructing Macroeconomics, also by Cambridge University Press (2007), in cooperation with Hiroshi Yoshikawa, further sharpened the process of embodying “a perspective from statistical physics and combinatorial stochastic processes” in economic modeling. Interestingly, almost concurrently with Prof. Aoki’s newest development, similar approaches were appearing. Thus, those who were working in the same context around the world at that time came together, exchanging their results during the past decade. In memory of Prof. Aoki, this book has been planned by authors who followed him to present the most advanced outcomes of his heritage.