Analyticity and a Priority Quine's Rejections of Two Dogmas
關於本電子書
This work will present a conceptual background and show how the line between analytic and synthetic propositions success-fully was drawn throughout early modern and followed by contemporary philosophy. In the traditionalists' interpretation, we will see how Quine dismisses the synonymous contents of analytic statements and why he unnecessarily denies any possibility of analytic statements that are a priori justified. The second wend of Quine's dlytMlelll will be scrutinized along with the discussion of his thesis, that'no statement is immune to revision'. We will see how Quine's argument leads him only to deadlock, which he primarily tries to avoid. At the end of this book, several approaches will be proposed where the analyticity and a priority are clearly distinguished from the empirical justifi-cation. By and large, Quine's arguments against a priority and the purported separation of analytic and synthetic statements will be critically analysed.
