Blunder: Britain's War in Iraq

Patrick Porter

loka 2018 · Oxford University Press

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Why did Britain go to war in Iraq in 2003? Existing accounts stress dodgy dossiers, intelligence failures, and the flaws of individual leaders. Deploying the large number of primary documents now available, this book puts ideas at the centre of the story. As the book argues, Britain's war in Iraq was caused by bad ideas that were dogmatically held and widely accepted. Three ideas in particular formed the war's intellectual foundations: the notion of the undeterrable, fanatical rogue state; the vision that the West's path to security is to break and remake states; and the conceit that by paying the 'blood price', Britain could secure influence in Washington DC. These issues matter, because although the Iraq War happened fifteen years ago, it is still with us. As well as its severe consequences for regional and international security, the ideas that powered the war persist in Western security debate. If all wars are fought twice, first on the battlefield and the second time in memory, this book enters the battle over what Iraq means now, and what we should learn.

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Patrick Porter is Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). His main research interests are U.S. and British grand strategy, the interaction of power and ideas in international relations, and diplomatic and military history. He has published in International Security, War in History and The Journal of Strategic Studies. He grew up in Melbourne, Australia, before completing his doctorate at the University of Oxford. He enjoys ancient history, cricket and cigars.