关于此电子书
A riveting combination of war memoir and analysis providing “valuable insights” into the role of military intelligence in Vietnam (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence).
For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units, including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country. Bob Baker was an intelligence analyst who was there.
In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVA’s tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.
For the first two weeks of the Easter Offensive of 1972, the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment provided the only pertinent collateral intelligence available to American forces. Twice daily, the Detachment provided intelligence to the USS Buchanan (DDG-14), US Navy SEALS, and Special Forces units, including tactical and strategic forecasts of enemy movements, information that was otherwise unavailable to U.S. units and advisors in-country. Bob Baker was an intelligence analyst who was there.
In the weeks before the offensive, vital agent reports and verbal warnings by the 571st MI Detachment had been ignored by all the major commands; they were only heeded, and then only very reluctantly, once the offensive began. This refusal to listen to the intelligence explains why no Army or USMC organizations were on-call to recover prisoners discovered or U.S. personnel downed behind enemy lines, as in the BAT-21 incident, as the last two Combat Recon Platoons in Vietnam had been disbanded six weeks before the offensive began. The lessons and experiences of Operation Lam Son 719 in the previous year were ignored, especially with regard to the NVA’s tactical use of tanks and artillery. In his memoir, Baker, the only trained military intelligence analyst with the 571st MI Detachment in 1972, reveals these and other heroics and blunders during a key moment in the Vietnam War.
作者简介
W.R. (Bob) Baker graduated first in the first Intelligence (Order of Battle) Analyst class to graduate from Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 1971. He was then the only intelligence analyst assigned to the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment/525th Military Intelligence Group in Da Nang, Vietnam, present at the time of the Easter Offensive of 1972. His further assignments after Vietnam included various positions for a combined total of 8 years with the European Defense Analysis Center/HQ, USEUCOM. He has received the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service, Joint Service and Army Commendation Medals. Bob has authored several articles on the Easter Offensive of 1972, intelligence, and Vietnam.
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