Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy

· Cambridge University Press
电子书
273

关于此电子书

How is the United States able to control the IMF with only 17 per cent of the votes? How are the rules of the global economy made? This book shows how a combination of formal and informal rules explains how international organizations really work. Randall W. Stone argues that formal rules apply in ordinary times, while informal power allows leading states to exert control when the stakes are high. International organizations are therefore best understood as equilibrium outcomes that balance the power and interests of the leading state and the member countries. Presenting a new model of institutional design and comparing the IMF, WTO, and EU, Stone argues that institutional variations reflect the distribution of power and interests. He shows that US interests influence the size, terms, and enforcement of IMF programs, and new data, archival documents, and interviews reveal the shortcomings of IMF programs in Mexico, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, and Argentina.

作者简介

Randall W. Stone is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition (2002) and Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade (1996). His articles have appeared in the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Review of International Organizations and Global Environmental Politics.

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