Free Will and Luck

Alfred R. Mele

сак 2006 · Oxford University Press

Пра гэту электронную кнігу

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.

Звесткі пра аўтара

Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is author of Irrationality (OUP 1987), Springs of Action (OUP 1992), Autonomous Agents (OUP 1995), and Motivation and Agency (OUP 2003), the editor of The Philosophy of Action (OUP 1997), and coeditor of Mental Causation (OUP 1993) and The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (OUP 2004).