How useful is Rawls’ Original Position for theorizing about a just society?: A Discussion

David Schneider

2018年4月 · GRIN Verlag

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Seminar paper from the year 2018 in the subject Politics - General and Theories of International Politics, grade: High Merit, London School of Economics, language: English, abstract: The original position (“OP”) is an essential component of John Rawls’s account of justice as presented in his seminal A Theory of Justice. In this essay, I claim that 1) Rawls OP is (at least in societies shaped by an individual conception of personhood) more useful for theorising about a just society than utilitarianism; 2) the OP fails (like other methodologies) to be useful for universally valid theorising about a just society; 3) for a society shaped by a communal conception of personhood, utilitarianism is as good as the OP for theorizing about a just society. To do so, I first present Rawls’ OP. Then I point out why the OP is more useful than utilitarianism when theorising about a just society. Third, I briefly mention a common objection against the OP and defend it against it. Finally, I present what I call the wake-up argument and its implications for theorising about a just society behind the veil of ignorance.

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Graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science