The Science of the Individual: Leibniz's Ontology of Individual Substance

Β· Topoi Library αžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…αž‘αžΈ 6 Β· Springer Science & Business Media
αžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…β€‹αž’αŸαž‘αž·αž…αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαž“αž·αž…
414
αž‘αŸ†αž–αŸαžš

αž’αŸ†αž–αžΈαžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…β€‹αž’αŸαž‘αž·αž…αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαž“αž·αž€αž“αŸαŸ‡

In his well-known Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz puts individual substance at the basis of metaphysical building. In so doing, he connects himself to a venerable tradition. His theory of individual concept, however, breaks with another idea of the same tradition, that no account of the individual as such can be given.

Contrary to what has been commonly accepted, Leibniz’s intuitions are not the mere result of the transcription of subject-predicate logic, nor of the uncritical persistence of some old metaphysical assumptions. They grow, instead, from an unprejudiced inquiry about our basic ontological framework, where logic of truth, linguistic analysis, and phenomenological experience of the mind’s life are tightly interwoven. Leibniz’s struggle for a concept capable of grasping concrete individuals as such is pursued in an age of great paradigm changes – from the Scholastic background to Hobbes’s nominalism to the Cartesian β€˜way of ideas’ or Spinoza’s substance metaphysics – when the relationships among words, ideas and things are intensively discussed and wholly reshaped.

This is the context where the genesis and significance of Leibniz’s theory of β€˜complete being’ and its concept are reconstrued. The result is a fresh look at some of the most perplexing issues in Leibniz scholarship, like his ideas about individual identity and the thesis that all its properties are essential to an individual.

The questions Leibniz faces, and to which his theory of individual substance aims to answer, are yet, to a large extent, those of contemporary metaphysics: how to trace a categorial framework? How to distinguish concrete and abstract items? What is the metaphysical basis of linguistic predication? How is trans-temporal sameness assured? How to make sense of essential attributions? In this ontological framework Leibniz’s further questions about the destiny of human individuals and their history are spelt out. Maybe his answers also have something to tell us.

This book is aimed at all who are interested in Leibniz’s philosophy, history of early modern philosophy and metaphysical issues in their historical development.

αžœαžΆαž™αžαž˜αŸ’αž›αŸƒαžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…β€‹αž’αŸαž‘αž·αž…αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαž“αž·αž€αž“αŸαŸ‡

αž”αŸ’αžšαžΆαž”αŸ‹αž™αžΎαž„αž’αŸ†αž–αžΈαž€αžΆαžšαž™αž›αŸ‹αžƒαžΎαž‰αžšαž”αžŸαŸ‹αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αŸ”

αž’αžΆαž“β€‹αž–αŸαžαŸŒαž˜αžΆαž“

αž‘αžΌαžšαžŸαž–αŸ’αž‘αž†αŸ’αž›αžΆαžαžœαŸƒ αž“αž·αž„β€‹αžαŸαž”αŸ’αž›αŸαž
αžŠαŸ†αž‘αžΎαž„αž€αž˜αŸ’αž˜αžœαž·αž’αžΈ Google Play Books αžŸαž˜αŸ’αžšαžΆαž”αŸ‹ Android αž“αž·αž„ iPad/iPhone αŸ” αžœαžΆβ€‹αž’αŸ’αžœαžΎαžŸαž˜αž€αžΆαž›αž€αž˜αŸ’αž˜β€‹αžŠαŸ„αž™αžŸαŸ’αžœαŸαž™αž”αŸ’αžšαžœαžαŸ’αžαž·αž‡αžΆαž˜αž½αž™β€‹αž‚αžŽαž“αžΈβ€‹αžšαž”αžŸαŸ‹αž’αŸ’αž“αž€β€‹ αž“αž·αž„β€‹αž’αž“αž»αž‰αŸ’αž‰αžΆαžαž±αŸ’αž™β€‹αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αž’αžΆαž“αž–αŸαž›β€‹αž˜αžΆαž“αž’αŸŠαžΈαž“αž’αžΊαžŽαž·αž αž¬αž‚αŸ’αž˜αžΆαž“β€‹αž’αŸŠαžΈαž“αž’αžΊαžŽαž·αžβ€‹αž“αŸ…αž‚αŸ’αžšαž”αŸ‹αž‘αžΈαž€αž“αŸ’αž›αŸ‚αž„αŸ”
αž€αž»αŸ†αž–αŸ’αž™αžΌαž‘αŸαžšβ€‹αž™αž½αžšαžŠαŸƒ αž“αž·αž„αž€αž»αŸ†αž–αŸ’αž™αžΌαž‘αŸαžš
αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αž’αžΆαž…αžŸαŸ’αžŠαžΆαž”αŸ‹αžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…αž‡αžΆαžŸαŸ†αž‘αŸαž„αžŠαŸ‚αž›αž”αžΆαž“αž‘αž·αž‰αž“αŸ…αž€αŸ’αž“αž»αž„ Google Play αžŠαŸ„αž™αž”αŸ’αžšαžΎαž€αž˜αŸ’αž˜αžœαž·αž’αžΈαžšαž»αž€αžšαž€αžαžΆαž˜αž’αŸŠαžΈαž“αž’αžΊαžŽαž·αžαž€αŸ’αž“αž»αž„αž€αž»αŸ†αž–αŸ’αž™αžΌαž‘αŸαžšαžšαž”αžŸαŸ‹αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αŸ”
eReaders αž“αž·αž„β€‹αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽαŸβ€‹αž•αŸ’αžŸαŸαž„β€‹αž‘αŸ€αž
αžŠαžΎαž˜αŸ’αž”αžΈαž’αžΆαž“αž“αŸ…αž›αžΎβ€‹αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽαŸ e-ink αžŠαžΌαž…αž‡αžΆβ€‹αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽαŸαž’αžΆαž“β€‹αžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…αž’αŸαž‘αž·αž…αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαž“αž·αž€ Kobo αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αž“αžΉαž„αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαžœβ€‹αž‘αžΆαž‰αž™αž€β€‹αž―αž€αžŸαžΆαžš αž αžΎαž™β€‹αž•αŸ’αž‘αŸαžšαžœαžΆαž‘αŸ…β€‹αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽαŸβ€‹αžšαž”αžŸαŸ‹αž’αŸ’αž“αž€αŸ” αžŸαžΌαž˜αž’αž“αž»αžœαžαŸ’αžαžαžΆαž˜β€‹αž€αžΆαžšαžŽαŸ‚αž“αžΆαŸ†αž›αž˜αŸ’αž’αž·αžαžšαž”αžŸαŸ‹αž˜αž‡αŸ’αžˆαž˜αžŽαŸ’αžŒαž›αž‡αŸ†αž“αž½αž™ αžŠαžΎαž˜αŸ’αž”αžΈαž•αŸ’αž‘αŸαžšαž―αž€αžŸαžΆαžšβ€‹αž‘αŸ…αž§αž”αž€αžšαžŽαŸαž’αžΆαž“αžŸαŸ€αžœαž—αŸ…β€‹αž’αŸαž‘αž·αž…αžαŸ’αžšαžΌαž“αž·αž€αžŠαŸ‚αž›αžŸαŸ’αž‚αžΆαž›αŸ‹αŸ”