Drawing on empirical evidence this book seeks to systematically analyses institutional shareholders’ incentives to activism to explain when and why shareholder activism will occur. The book puts forward a model which explains the factors that determine institutional shareholders’ propensity for activism. The model both elaborates the collective benefits of activism as a means of achieving managerial accountability asks whether and when shareholder activism is rational for any individual shareholder. The book then goes to on to apply these finding to both the UK and China in order to explain the varying levels of shareholder activism in each jurisdiction. The book is the first to take an in-depth look at institutional share-holder activism in China providing prescriptions to promote greater shareholder engagement and exploring the potential it holds for improving corporate governance in the region.
Unlike other texts that tend to focus solely on the board of directors and the takeover market, Yu has enlarged the scope of this study to cover both market forces and contractual mechanisms, providing readers with an extended and comprehensive discussion of the pertinent issues.
It explores a range of issues and their role in corporate governance models, including:
executive compensation takeover markets the securities market insolvency issues venture capital market
Examining the current climate and making the case that comparative corporate governance studies have significant policy implications for China’s transitional economy, Yu has put together a book that is a valuable resource for students and those working in Asian business, corporate governance and commercial law.