Comparative Economic Analysis of Regulatory Competition in Corporate Law in Europe and the United States

Robin Eyben

2013年8月 · GRIN Verlag

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Master's Thesis from the year 2006 in the subject Law - Comparative Legal Systems, Comparative Law, grade: Sehr Gut, University of Hamburg (Institut für Recht und Ökonomik), language: English, abstract: In the US it is principally the states that are in charge of regulating the internal affairs of corporations. States allow firms to relocate in other states. Hence, it is argued that states are engaging in a process of competing for corporate charters. In the EU this basic setting is today quite similar: the EU Member States have separately created their own corporate law systems for decades. Though only since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in a series of famous decisions from Centros to Inspire Art that Member States have to recognize firms who are incorporated under other Member States’ corporate law, the possibility for regulatory competition in corporate is opened in the EU as well. Comparing the situations in Europe and America from a law and economics perspective, the guiding hypothesis of this thesis is that while regulatory competition in corporate law can lead to efficient results, several problems have to be taken into account. Inefficiencies in American and European regulatory competition in corporate law are mainly due to these problems. A possible normative solution to such inefficiencies is assessed. Other findings of this thesis involves the following aspects: Firstly, while regulatory competition in corporate law in the U.S. might have been economically efficient in the past, it now can be identified several factors that lead to suboptimal outcomes which can be explained positively by applying existing theories on the issue as complementary ones. Secondly, the European legal and economic situation resembles important factors of the American one while there are some major differences that will probably lead to different outcomes to those in the U.S. – though these are suboptimal as well. Thirdly, a normative conclusion is drawn from these comparative observations. It can be efficient to restructure the framework in which regulatory competition in corporate law takes place in both, the U.S. and the EU. It is proposed a form of procedural harmonization and a simplification of conflict of laws that will allow states to compete for separate modules of legal sectors in corporate law. Thus innovation and learning processes in corporate regulations will be easier comparable and a sustainable race to the top may begin.