Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment

Michael A Bishop · J. D. Trout

dic 2004 · Oxford University Press

Acerca de este libro electrónico

Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how people can improve their reasoning by relying on Statistical Prediction Rules (SPRs). They then develop and articulate the positive core of the book. Their view, Strategic Reliabilism, claims that epistemic excellence consists in the efficient allocation of cognitive resources to reliable reasoning strategies, applied to significant problems. The last third of the book develops the implications of this view for standard analytic epistemology; for resolving normative disputes in psychology; and for offering practical, concrete advice on how this theory can improve real people's reasoning. This is a truly distinctive and controversial work that spans many disciplines and will speak to an unusually diverse group, including people in epistemology, philosophy of science, decision theory, cognitive and clinical psychology, and ethics and public policy.

Acerca del autor

Michael Bishop is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University. His work has appeared in journals such as Philosophy of Science, No?s, American Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese. J. D. Trout is Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Professor at the Parmly Hearing Institute, Loyola University Chicago. He has authored an award-winning book, Measuring the Intentional World (Oxford 1998), and has co-authored or co-edited three other books. His work has appeared in journals such as Philosophy of Science, No?s, Psychological Review, and Current Directions in Psychological Science.