Information asymmetry in principal-agent relationships: Lessons learned from Enron

Andre Wiedenhofer · Markus H. Krahnke

2007年6月 · GRIN Verlag

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Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: B, University of Applied Sciences Essen (IOM), course: Human Resource Management (MBA), language: English, abstract: This paper investigates the principal-agent problems within the collapse of Enron and why safeguarding activities did not lead to positive results. Having set the framework of principal-agent relationship in general, the focus will be put on Enron. In order to reduce the complexity two specifc cases will be extracted from overall case of Enron. Different potential safeguarding activities will be crafted. Finnally, it will be stated, that separating the implementation of safeguarding activities can be lead to the desired results.