LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War
7/2010 · University of Texas Press
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“[A] compelling analysis . . . A solid addition to our understanding of the Vietnam War and a president.” —Publishers Weekly
The Vietnam War remains a divisive memory for Americans—partisans on all sides still debate why it was fought, how it could have been better fought, and whether it could have been won at all.
In this major study, a noted expert on the war brings a needed objectivity to these debates by examining dispassionately how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, including the Tom Johnson notes from the influential Tuesday Lunch Group, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson’s decision making, Johnson’s relations with his military commanders, the administration’s pacification program of 1965–1967, the management of public opinion, and the “fighting while negotiating” strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968.
This in-depth analysis, from a prize-winning historian and National Book Critics Circle Award finalist, exposes numerous flaws in Johnson’s approach, in a “concise, well-researched account” that “critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion” (Library Journal).
The Vietnam War remains a divisive memory for Americans—partisans on all sides still debate why it was fought, how it could have been better fought, and whether it could have been won at all.
In this major study, a noted expert on the war brings a needed objectivity to these debates by examining dispassionately how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, including the Tom Johnson notes from the influential Tuesday Lunch Group, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson’s decision making, Johnson’s relations with his military commanders, the administration’s pacification program of 1965–1967, the management of public opinion, and the “fighting while negotiating” strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968.
This in-depth analysis, from a prize-winning historian and National Book Critics Circle Award finalist, exposes numerous flaws in Johnson’s approach, in a “concise, well-researched account” that “critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion” (Library Journal).
O autorovi
George C. Herring is an Alumni Professor of History at the University of Kentucky.
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