Personnel Problems May Hamper Army's Individual Ready Reserve in Wartime: Report to the Congress of the United States

United States. General Accounting Office

ene 1983 · U.S. General Accounting Office

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GAO assessed the impact of actions initiated since 1977 by Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) on the Army's Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). GAO specified serious personnel problems with IRR and questioned the appropriateness and justification of legislative proposals submitted by DOD to the 97th Congress to increase IRR personnel strength. IRR is a primary source of pretrained individuals which augments the Active Force and Selected Reserve Units in wartime or a national emergency. GAO found that: (1) the IRR strength of about 227,000 is less than half the strength needed to meet personnel requirements; (2) some members may not be suitable for service; and (3) the percentage of IRR members expected to report for duty upon mobilization is not based upon scientific assumptions. GAO also noted that the Army lacks current addresses on many individual IRR members. Further, individuals with critical skills are in short supply, although the Army has recently tried direct enlistment and reenlistment bonus programs, both of which have been submitted to the 97th Congress for reauthorization. To increase IRR strength levels, DOD proposed legislation to the 97th Congress to increase the total military service obligation from 6 to 8 years and, if this legislation is reintroduced into the 98th Congress and passes, it would affect the time served in the IRR. Under such circumstances, GAO believes that developing a viable refresher training program would be essential for maintaining members' skills.