Theories of the Bargaining Process
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The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach.
The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.
Alan Coddington received his Ph.D. from the University of York where the research for this book was conducted. He is lecturer in economics, Queen Mary College, London, and is co-author of The Elementary Ideas of Game Theory.
G. L. S. Shackle (1903-1992) was Brunner Professor of Economic Science at the University of Liverpool and was widely known for a succession of major contributions to economic studies, including Expectation in Economics, Economics for Pleasure, A Scheme of Economic Theory, and The Years of High Theory.
