Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games

David W.K. Yeung · Leon A. Petrosjan

May 2006 · Springer Science & Business Media

About this ebook

Stochastic differential games represent one of the most complex forms of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution and stochastic elements have to be considered simultaneously. The complexity of stochastic differential games generally leads to great difficulties in the derivation of solutions. Cooperative games hold out the promise of more socially optimal and group efficient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Despite urgent calls for national and international cooperation, the absence of formal solutions has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem.

The book supplies effective tools for rigorous study of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable "payoff distribution procedure" of subgame consistent solution is presented. Being capable of deriving analytical tractable solutions, the work is not only theoretically interesting but would enable the hitherto intractable problems in cooperative stochastic differential games to be fruitfully explored.

Currently, this book is the first ever volume devoted to cooperative stochastic differential games. It aims to provide its readers an effective tool to analyze cooperative arrangements of conflict situations with uncertainty over time. Cooperative game theory has succeeded in offering many applications of game theory in operations research, management, economics, politics and other disciplines. The extension of these applications to a dynamic environment with stochastic elements should be fruitful. The book will be of interest to game theorists, mathematicians, economists, policy-makers, corporate planners and graduate students.