In the fall of 2008, fifteen of the world's leading economists--representing the broadest spectrum of economic opinion--gathered at New Hampshire's Squam Lake. Their goal: the mapping of a long-term plan for financial regulation reform.

The Squam Lake Report distills the wealth of insights from the ongoing collaboration that began at these meetings and provides a revelatory, unified, and coherent voice for fixing our troubled and damaged financial markets. As an alternative to the patchwork solutions and ideologically charged proposals that have dominated other discussions, the Squam Lake group sets forth a clear nonpartisan plan of action to transform the regulation of financial markets--not just for the current climate--but for generations to come.


Arguing that there has been a conflict between financial institutions and society, these diverse experts present sound and transparent prescriptions to reduce this divide. They look at the critical holes in the existing regulatory framework for handling complex financial institutions, retirement savings, and credit default swaps. They offer ideas for new financial instruments designed to recapitalize banks without burdening taxpayers. To lower the risk that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements as well as a systemic regulator who is part of the central bank. They collectively analyze where the financial system has failed, and how these weak points should be overhauled.


Combining an immense depth of academic, private sector, and public policy experience, The Squam Lake Report contains urgent recommendations that will positively influence everyone's financial well-being--all who care about the world's economic health need to pay attention.

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About the author

Kenneth R. French is the Carl E. and Catherine M. Heidt Professor of Finance at Dartmouth College. Martin N. Baily is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. John Y. Campbell is the Morton L. and Carole S. Olshan Professor of Economics at Harvard University. John H. Cochrane is the AQR Capital Management Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago. Douglas W. Diamond is the Merton H. Miller Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago. Darrell Duffie is the Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at Stanford University. Anil K Kashyap is the Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago. Frederic S. Mishkin is the Alfred Lerner Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions at Columbia University. Raghuram G. Rajan is the Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago. David S. Scharfstein is the Edmund Cogswell Converse Professor of Finance and Banking at Harvard University. Robert J. Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics at Yale University. Hyun Song Shin is the Hughes-Rogers Professor of Economics at Princeton University. Matthew J. Slaughter is the Signal Companies Professor of Management at Dartmouth College. Jeremy C. Stein is the Moise Y. Safra Professor of Economics at Harvard University. René M. Stulz is the Everett D. Reese Chair of Banking and Monetary Economics at Ohio State University.
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Additional Information

Publisher
Princeton University Press
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Published on
May 25, 2010
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Pages
168
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ISBN
9781400835805
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Language
English
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Genres
Business & Economics / Banks & Banking
Business & Economics / Economic Conditions
Business & Economics / Economics / General
Business & Economics / Finance / General
Business & Economics / Public Finance
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Content Protection
This content is DRM protected.
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Available on Android devices
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Eligible for Family Library

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Dealer banks--that is, large banks that deal in securities and derivatives, such as J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs--are of a size and complexity that sharply distinguish them from typical commercial banks. When they fail, as we saw in the global financial crisis, they pose significant risks to our financial system and the world economy. How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It examines how these banks collapse and how we can prevent the need to bail them out.

In sharp, clinical detail, Darrell Duffie walks readers step-by-step through the mechanics of large-bank failures. He identifies where the cracks first appear when a dealer bank is weakened by severe trading losses, and demonstrates how the bank's relationships with its customers and business partners abruptly change when its solvency is threatened. As others seek to reduce their exposure to the dealer bank, the bank is forced to signal its strength by using up its slim stock of remaining liquid capital. Duffie shows how the key mechanisms in a dealer bank's collapse--such as Lehman Brothers' failure in 2008--derive from special institutional frameworks and regulations that influence the flight of short-term secured creditors, hedge-fund clients, derivatives counterparties, and most devastatingly, the loss of clearing and settlement services.



How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It reveals why today's regulatory and institutional frameworks for mitigating large-bank failures don't address the special risks to our financial system that are posed by dealer banks, and outlines the improvements in regulations and market institutions that are needed to address these systemic risks.

The subprime mortgage crisis has already wreaked havoc on the lives of millions of people and now it threatens to derail the U.S. economy and economies around the world. In this trenchant book, best-selling economist Robert Shiller reveals the origins of this crisis and puts forward bold measures to solve it. He calls for an aggressive response--a restructuring of the institutional foundations of the financial system that will not only allow people once again to buy and sell homes with confidence, but will create the conditions for greater prosperity in America and throughout the deeply interconnected world economy.

Shiller blames the subprime crisis on the irrational exuberance that drove the economy's two most recent bubbles--in stocks in the 1990s and in housing between 2000 and 2007. He shows how these bubbles led to the dangerous overextension of credit now resulting in foreclosures, bankruptcies, and write-offs, as well as a global credit crunch. To restore confidence in the markets, Shiller argues, bailouts are needed in the short run. But he insists that these bailouts must be targeted at low-income victims of subprime deals. In the longer term, the subprime solution will require leaders to revamp the financial framework by deploying an ambitious package of initiatives to inhibit the formation of bubbles and limit risks, including better financial information; simplified legal contracts and regulations; expanded markets for managing risks; home equity insurance policies; income-linked home loans; and new measures to protect consumers against hidden inflationary effects.

This powerful book is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how we got into the subprime mess--and how we can get out.

Winner of the prestigious Paul A. Samuelson Award for scholarly writing on lifelong financial security, John Cochrane's Asset Pricing now appears in a revised edition that unifies and brings the science of asset pricing up to date for advanced students and professionals. Cochrane traces the pricing of all assets back to a single idea--price equals expected discounted payoff--that captures the macro-economic risks underlying each security's value. By using a single, stochastic discount factor rather than a separate set of tricks for each asset class, Cochrane builds a unified account of modern asset pricing. He presents applications to stocks, bonds, and options. Each model--consumption based, CAPM, multifactor, term structure, and option pricing--is derived as a different specification of the discounted factor.

The discount factor framework also leads to a state-space geometry for mean-variance frontiers and asset pricing models. It puts payoffs in different states of nature on the axes rather than mean and variance of return, leading to a new and conveniently linear geometrical representation of asset pricing ideas.


Cochrane approaches empirical work with the Generalized Method of Moments, which studies sample average prices and discounted payoffs to determine whether price does equal expected discounted payoff. He translates between the discount factor, GMM, and state-space language and the beta, mean-variance, and regression language common in empirical work and earlier theory.


The book also includes a review of recent empirical work on return predictability, value and other puzzles in the cross section, and equity premium puzzles and their resolution. Written to be a summary for academics and professionals as well as a textbook, this book condenses and advances recent scholarship in financial economics.

Raghuram Rajan was one of the few economists who warned of the global financial crisis before it hit. Now, as the world struggles to recover, it's tempting to blame what happened on just a few greedy bankers who took irrational risks and left the rest of us to foot the bill. In Fault Lines, Rajan argues that serious flaws in the economy are also to blame, and warns that a potentially more devastating crisis awaits us if they aren't fixed.

Rajan shows how the individual choices that collectively brought about the economic meltdown--made by bankers, government officials, and ordinary homeowners--were rational responses to a flawed global financial order in which the incentives to take on risk are incredibly out of step with the dangers those risks pose. He traces the deepening fault lines in a world overly dependent on the indebted American consumer to power global economic growth and stave off global downturns. He exposes a system where America's growing inequality and thin social safety net create tremendous political pressure to encourage easy credit and keep job creation robust, no matter what the consequences to the economy's long-term health; and where the U.S. financial sector, with its skewed incentives, is the critical but unstable link between an overstimulated America and an underconsuming world.


In Fault Lines, Rajan demonstrates how unequal access to education and health care in the United States puts us all in deeper financial peril, even as the economic choices of countries like Germany, Japan, and China place an undue burden on America to get its policies right. He outlines the hard choices we need to make to ensure a more stable world economy and restore lasting prosperity.

New perspectives on Japan's “lost decade” viewed in the context of recent financial turmoil.

Japan's economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, and the country entered its famous “lost decade”—a period of stagnation and economic disruption that persisted until 2003. The current declines in global equity and real estate markets have eerie parallels to Japan's economic woes of the 1990s. If we are to avoid repeating Japan's experience on a global scale, we must understand what happened, why it happened, and the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of Japan's policy choices. In this volume, prominent economists—Japan specialists and others—bring state-of-the-art models and analytic tools to bear on these questions. The essays generate new facts and new findings about Japan's lost decade. As much of the research shows, the slowdown can be broken down into two phases: a typical recession, followed by a breakdown in the economy likely due to insufficient restructuring, which is not well described by conventional models. The contributors offer forceful arguments showing that Japan's experience, and the unconventional—sometimes unsuccessful—measures adopted by Japan's government and central bank, offer valuable lessons for our post-boom world.

Contributors
Kenn Ariga, Robert Barsky, Diego Comin, Robert Dekle, Kyoji Fukao, Koichi Hamada, Takeo Hoshi, Ryo Kambayashi, Anil K Kashyap, Takao Kato, Satoshi Koibuchi, Philip R. Lane, John Muellbauer, Kiko Murata, Maurice Obstfeld, Ryosuke Okazawa, Joe Peek, Ulrike Schaede, David E. Weinstein

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